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FINDING JUSTICE SCALIA IN BURMA: 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE 
IMPEACHMENT OF MYANMAR’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRIBUNAL 
Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. † 
Abstract: While the comparative courts literature has yielded valuable insights 
into confrontations between political elites and judges, we still know relatively little 
about if and how jurisprudential methodology affects the ability of constitutional courts 
to survive such crises.  How does the choice between originalism versus living 
constitutionalism affect a court’s relationship with the other branches of government?  Do 
political elites tend to be more hostile towards certain methods of interpretation? 
The 2012 impeachment of Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal presents an 
interesting example of the interplay between jurisprudence and politics.  After fifty years 
of military rule, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution produced a new civilian government that 
appeared committed to political reform.  However, when the Tribunal ruled that 
legislative committees did not have constitutional status, the legislature impeached all 
nine members, forcing them to resign.  Less than two years after it was created, the 
Constitutional Tribunal was essentially defunct.  This article argues that the 
Constitutional Tribunal’s approach towards constitutional interpretation did not 
ameliorate—and might have exacerbated—the crisis.  Using a textualist or originalist 
methodology, the Tribunal struck down national legislation in four out of the five cases it 
heard.  However, the Tribunal’s reasoning did not balance the legislature’s interests, 
much less account for the dramatic political reforms.  The Tribunal also never provided a 
defense to its constitutional review power, and many legislators feared that the Tribunal 
was usurping their newfound power.  Had the Tribunal adopted a more flexible 
approach—such as proportionality or living constitutionalism—it might have soothed the 
legislature’s fears while still reaching similar policy outcomes. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
While there has been considerable research on confrontations between 
political elites and judges,1 we still know relatively little about if and how 
jurisprudential methodology affects the ability of constitutional courts to 
survive such crises.  How does the choice between originalism versus living 
constitutionalism affect a court’s relationship with the other branches of 
government?  Do political elites tend to be more hostile towards certain 
                                                      
† Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the University of Michigan Political 
Science Department.  He received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a Masters in 
Southeast Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS.  The author would like to thank Sumit Bisarya, 
Nicholas Cheesman, Melissa Crouch, Tom Ginsburg, Andrew Harding, Aung Htoo, Dr. Nay Win Maung, 
Kyaw Zaw Naing, Eugene Quah, Kyaw Min San, David I. Steinberg, Nathan Willis, Khin Zaw Win, and 
well as the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their comments and assistance. 
1  See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC. REV. 
87 (1996). 
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methods of interpretation?  Much of the judicial politics literature implicitly 
assumes that political elites care largely, perhaps even exclusively, about the 
policy outcomes of decisions and pay little attention to the way in which that 
outcome is reached.2  However, if, as many judges claim, the chosen method 
of constitutional interpretation helps determine a particular outcome,3 then 
the two are inextricably linked.  The method of interpretation might also 
frame how political elites and the public at large view the court’s decision, 
as well as influence the court’s ability to avoid charges of judicial activism. 
This article looks at the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal of 
Myanmar (Burma)4 before the impeachment of its members in August 2012.  
At first, Myanmar might appear to be an odd choice for an article about 
constitutional interpretation.  Its 2008 Constitution has been heavily 
criticized5 and the country is still in the early stages of a fragile political 
transition. 6   However, despite these inauspicious beginnings, the 
Constitutional Tribunal members soon issued several rulings declaring 
government actions unconstitutional.7  Through its jurisprudence, this article 
argues that the Tribunal developed a consistent—if not explicit—textualist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  Moreover, the Tribunal’s approach 
to interpretation seems to have exacerbated the response of the Legislature to 
adverse decisions. 
Part II of this article begins by reviewing the main theories of 
constitutional interpretation and discussing the role of constitutional 
ambiguity more broadly.  Part III summarizes Myanmar’s history with 
constitutional review, as well as key provisions of the 2008 Constitution.  
Next, Part IV focuses on the structure and powers of the Constitutional 
                                                      
2  This is particularly true in the strategic institutionalist literature, which models the relationship 
between the judiciary and executive branch.  See infra note 53. 
3  See infra note 24. 
4  In 1988, Myanmar’s government changed the official English-language name of the country from 
“Burma” to “Myanmar.”  Most countries, as well as the United Nations, use “Myanmar.”  However, some 
Burmese pro-democracy activists and foreign governments still call the country “Burma.”  See generally 
Lowell Dittmer, Burma vs. Myanmar: What’s in a Name? 48 ASIAN SURV. 885, 885 (2008).  In this article, 
the term “Myanmar” is used not to indicate political sympathies, but rather to remain consistent with the 
name of the country as written in the 2008 Constitution (Pyihtaungsu Thamada Myanmar Naingngandaw 
or “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”).  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF 
MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 2 (Myan.). 
5  See, e.g., David C. Williams, Lessons of Experience in the Enterprise of Constitutional Design: 
Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1657 
(2009); YASH GHAI, THE 2008 MYANMAR CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT (2008), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/2008_Myanmar_constitution--analysis_and_assessment-Yash_Ghai. 
pdf. 
6  See generally Lee Jones, The Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition, 44 J. OF CONTEMP. 
ASIA 144 (2014). 
7  See, e.g., The Chief Justice of the Union v. Ministry of Home Affairs, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23 
(Myan.), as well as other cases discussed in Section IV.C of this article. 
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Tribunal and analyzes each of its five decisions.  Part V uses this analysis to 
draw broader conclusions as to the part that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence 
might have played in the August 2012 impeachment crisis.  Part VI 
concludes with thoughts on potential amendments for the 2008 Constitution 
that would set a clear standard of constitutional interpretation. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
This section provides a theoretical framework for understanding 
constitutional interpretation.  First, it discusses the causes of constitutional 
ambiguity and the need for interpretation.  Next, it discusses several of the 
most important jurisprudential approaches to constitutional interpretation, 
including textualism, originalism, living constitutionalism, and 
proportionality.  While there has been little research into the interplay 
between interpretative methodologies and political behavior, this section 
concludes by arguing that theories of constitutional interpretation can in fact 
influence judicial decision-making. 
A.  The Role of Constitutional Ambiguity 
While lawyers value clarity and certainty in the law, constitutional 
drafters frequently leave key language ambiguous, sometimes deliberately.  
The tradeoff between precise rules and vague standards in constitutions can 
be characterized as “implicitly also a choice between legislative and judicial 
rulemaking.”8  Drafters can either write clear provisions that require little 
interpretation, such as a strict numerical threshold, or vague standards, such 
as “reasonableness,” that must be interpreted by judges.  According to Isaac 
Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner's logic, precise constitutional rules represent 
an ex ante attempt by constitutional drafters to anticipate and legislate for 
certain types of legal disputes, whereas standards allow courts to apply the 
constitution ex post facto.9 
                                                      
8  Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 261 (1974). 
9  See id. at 273-74.  The difference between rules and standards can be overstated.  Judicial 
precedent and stare decisis help lawyers predict how courts will apply standards to particular facts.  In fact, 
over time, the body of case law can take the form of precise rules.  See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).  Nevertheless, as political scientists Jeffrey A. 
Segal and Harold J. Spaeth demonstrate, judicial precedent does not seem to “bind” judges, especially 
when it is so easy for lawyers to distinguish one fact pattern from another.  Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold H. 
Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. OF POL. 
SCI. 971 (1996). 
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Ehrlich and Posner’s argument is based upon the assumption that 
precision entails costs.10  A certain amount of flexibility is often necessary in 
order to ensure that the application of the constitution furthers the goals of 
the constitutional drafters.  Excessive precision might lead to over-
deterrence or under-deterrence of regulated political behavior because the 
rule cannot properly prescribe a threshold that correctly anticipates the 
decision-making process of political elites. 11   Constitutional drafters 
foreseeably cannot regulate all eventualities with precision due to the 
enormous variety of possible political behaviors and political actors.12  In 
extreme cases, excessive precision could lead courts to perverse outcomes or 
arbitrary decisions, as they try to apply a constitutional rule uniformly, 
overlooking the differing incentives of different classes of political actors. 
Precision also risks confining the relevance of a constitutional 
provision to a certain time and place.  For example, eleven of the seventy-
eight articles of Germany's 1871 Constitution detailed regulation of the 
railroad and telegraph systems, but these systems are no longer pressing 
concerns in the early 21st century.13  By contrast, the vagueness of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” allows it to remain applicable as the technology 
available to the police changes over time.14  Precise legal rules are even less 
suited to jurisdictions with high levels of economic and social heterogeneity 
or technological change because in such jurisdictions, it becomes more 
difficult to anticipate how the rules will be applied in different contexts.15  
On the other hand, constitutional drafters face a principal-agent 
problem in ensuring that judges interpret the constitution in line with their 
preferences.  One solution is to constrain judicial discretion by writing 
detailed laws.16  Precision limits the ability of agents to deviate from the 
principal's preferences by “narrow[ing] the scope for reasonable 
                                                      
10  Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 307, 307 (1994). 
11  See id. at 331. 
12  Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 413 (2000). 
13  ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 86 (2009). 
14  See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (finding that the use of thermal imaging 
technology to scan heat signatures from a marijuana farm violated Fourth Amendment rights). 
15  See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 8, at 273-74.  In fact, many scholars credit the common law 
legal system for furthering economic growth because judge-made law is more flexible and can better 
protect private property.  See generally Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin 
Matter?, 31 J. OF COMP. ECON. 653 (2003); Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 453 (2003); 
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). 
16  C.f., JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 11 (2002) (arguing that Congress uses detail in healthcare 
legislation to constrain executive agencies). 
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interpretation,”17 except in novel or exceptional cases.  At the opposite 
extreme, countries that do not possess a mechanism for constitutional review 
might feel less compelled to preempt future disputes with precise language 
because the legislature can reinterpret or rewrite ambiguous provisions at 
will. 
This conventional wisdom has recently been challenged by empirical 
research suggesting that drafters might prefer to establish stronger 
constitutional courts when the constitution is more specific.18  Political 
actors and interest groups who demand specific provisions would need a 
mechanism to enforce the constitution in order to effectuate the benefits of 
their lobbying efforts.19  As the number of these concessions increases, the 
number of stakeholders who have an interest in enforcing the constitutional 
bargain also rises.20  Thus, constitutional drafters are more likely to authorize 
constitutional review as a means of managing disputes, recouping costs, and 
enforcing the constitutional bargain. 21   Indeed, the Comparative 
Constitutions Project, a cross-national study of every constitution extant 
since 1789, found that greater constitutional detail tended to extend the 
expected lifespan of constitutions.22 
B.  Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 
Given that constitutional language is frequently ambiguous, how then 
do judges interpret that ambiguity?  Judges purport to take this question very 
seriously, frequently allocating much of their decisions to explaining or 
debating the finer points of interpretative methodologies.23  Some have even 
become public apostles of particular approaches.24  Despite their differences, 
                                                      
17  Abbott, supra note 12, at 412; see also Jeffrey K. Staton & Alexia Romero, Clarity and 
Compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System (International Political Science Association, 
Working Paper, 2011). 
18  ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 87. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  The life expectancy of a constitution at the maximum level of detail is around 80 years, whereas 
the life expectancy at the lowest level of detail falls to the teens.  Id. at 141; see also Christopher W. 
Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-
Oriented Constitutions, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 837 (1999). 
23  Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (using textual and 
historical evidence to argue that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not limited to the purpose of 
keeping a “well-regulated militia”) with Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting 
the Second Amendment through the purpose of keeping a “well-regulated militia” and proposing an 
“interest-balancing” standard). 
24  This is especially true in the U.S., where justices debate constitutional interpretation in public fora 
and publish books on the subject.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, SCALIA AND 
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most judges claim that their decision in a case is determined by their 
methodological approach, not by their policy preferences.25  In other words, 
judges claim that they only have discretion in choosing a methodology, not 
in reaching particular case outcomes.26 
Perhaps the most intuitive approach to constitutional interpretation is 
textualism.  Textualists argue judges should only consider the “plain 
meaning” of a word and not consider outside sources, such as legislative 
drafting history.27  Textualists evaluate the meaning of words based on the 
standard of a “skilled, objectively reasonable” person.28  To a significant 
extent, textualism downplays the extent of ambiguity in constitutions.  The 
approach rejects the notion that judges should consider the range of 
meanings to which a term is reasonably susceptible, instead preferring the 
“plain meaning” of the word.29  
In many cases, constitutional language is too ambiguous to discern a 
“plain meaning” when applied to actual cases.30  Moreover, words in legal 
documents do not always have the same meaning as the dictionary or 
colloquial definitions. 31   However, acknowledging ambiguity also risks 
opening the door to unfettered judicial discretion.  As such, other schools 
                                                                                                                                                                 
GARNER'S READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2007). 
25  See, e.g., id.; Antonin Scalia, Textualism and the Constitution, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY: A 
READER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 288-90 (Bruce Miroff et al. eds., 2012). 
26  Perhaps most famously when current U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts testified before Congress 
that a judge’s role is to serve as an “umpire” and not to “make the rules.”  Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, 
N.Y. TIMES, July, 11, 2008, at WK1.  
27  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24. 
28  Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 59, 65 (1988). 
29  Bradley C. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction, 17 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401-02 (1994).  This is in contrast to Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1968) (finding that the 
court’s role was to determine whether parol evidence was “reasonably susceptible” to a defendant’s 
interpretation under the Uniform Commercial Code). 
30  For example, the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protection against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” does not define the scope of “unreasonable.”  Subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
have clarified that searches and seizures without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless conducted 
pursuant to certain delineated exceptions, such as hot pursuit or in loco parentis.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325 (1985). 
31  For example, with the rise of interstate commercial activity during the Industrial Revolution, the 
scope of Congress’ jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution’s “Commerce Clause” became less clear.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Since the New Deal, court decisions have interpreted the clause as granting 
Congress authority to regulate activities that do not necessarily fall within the dictionary definition of the 
term “commerce.”  See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding that Congress 
could regulate civil rights because segregation affected interstate commerce); Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 
483 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress could enact legislation to protect wildlife because in aggregate 
wildlife could affect commerce). 
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have attempted to establish rigorous and consistent rules for interpreting 
constitutional ambiguity. 
Originalists argue that judges should only interpret ambiguous 
constitutional provisions based on how a reasonable person at the time of its 
adoption would have interpreted the language.32  This approach allows 
judges to use historical evidence such as proceedings from a constitutional 
convention in order to establish the historical validity of a particular 
interpretation.33  United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues 
that originalism has a crucial function in a democracy in preventing judges 
from usurping the authority of the legislature.34 
Critics of originalism worry that it is impractical at best, and at worst 
risks imposing outcomes that conflict with modern standards of justice.35  As 
a practical matter, historical source materials might prove scant or, even 
worse, biased.36  Many countries do not possess transcripts of public debates 
surrounding the adoption of a new constitution in the manner of the U.S. 
Federalist Papers.  As a theoretical matter, critics of originalism argue that 
law and legal norms evolve such that originalism risks imposing the 
outdated views of past generations—the “dead hand of the past”—on future 
generations.37 
Proponents of living constitutionalism (or “active liberty”) argue that 
judges must acknowledge the contemporary social and political norms and 
values to inform their interpretation of the constitution.38  For example, in 
the U.S. context, living constitutionalists would point out that a reasonable 
person in 1789 would have excluded slaves, women, and many others from 
the democratic system and Bill of Rights.39  It would be unreasonable and 
undesirable to force judges in the 21st century to interpret terms such as 
“property” in that context.40  Living constitutionalism does not mean that 
judges are completely unconstrained.  Rather, judges are constrained by the 
underlying principles of the constitution, such as “freedom from government 
                                                      
32  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989). 
33  Ethan Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT 353, 356 
(2007). 
34  Scalia, supra note 32, at 854. 
35  See Leib, supra note 33, at 358-59. 
36  Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 171-72 (2008). 
37  Leib, supra note 33, at 358-59; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (INALIENABLE 
RIGHTS) 33-50 (2010). 
38  See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 
Speech at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985). 
39  BREYER, supra note 24, at 33. 
40  Obviously, originalists do not go to this extreme this today, partly because the 14th, 15th, and 16th 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have removed slavery from the text.  Nevertheless, the example 
serves to highlight in reductio one of the frequent criticisms of originalism. 
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coercion,” and must interpret it in that context.41  Taking this approach a step 
further, Professor John Hart Ely argues judges should actively interpret the 
U.S. Constitution in a manner that enhances the ability of minority 
populations to participate in democracy and prevents against a “majority 
tyranny.”42  
When constitutional interpretation involves complex policy or moral 
questions, judges might use proportionality and balancing tests to weigh 
competing interests.43  The exact criteria for making such assessments varies 
by country.  The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted tiers of scrutiny for 
different rights, with the highest being strict scrutiny for laws that 
discriminate on the basis of race (and arguably gender).44  In such cases, the 
government must have a compelling interest in the policy and the means 
adopted must be narrowly tailored towards that end.45  Amongst younger 
constitutional courts, the proportionality test has become popular. 46  
Proportionality requires that government infringements on rights 1) be for an 
objective of sufficient purpose, and 2) the means chosen must be 
“reasonable and just.”47  In assessing the means, courts consider if 1) there 
exists a rational basis for the policy, 2) the government employed the least 
restrictive means possible, and 3) the law’s objectives are proportional to the 
constitutional harms it causes. 48   Notably, unlike the other methods, 
                                                      
41  See BREYER, supra note 24, at 3. 
42  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (1981). 
43  See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 652 (6th ed. 
2006). 
44  See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the government’s compelling 
interest in preventing sabotage permitted it to detain Japanese Americans in internment camps). 
45  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (finding that a state’s interest in education 
was not a sufficiently compelling interest to require compulsory education for religious minorities). 
46  For example, constitutional courts in Canada (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)), Israel 
(HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov. of Isr. [2004] (Isr.)), Colombia (Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-355/2006), and South Africa (South Africa v. 
Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.)) have all used variants on the method.  See generally Alec Stone Sweet 
& Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 
72 (2008). 
47  See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, § 1 (U.K.) (making rights “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”); S. AFR. CONST., 
1996, § 36 (noting that right can be limited only “to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom . . . ”); Basic 
Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, 1454 SH 90 § 4 (Isr.) [hereinafter Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation (Isr.)] (guaranteeing freedom of occupation “except by a law befitting the values of the State of 
Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required . . . ”). 
48  Id.  
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proportionality explicitly permits government infringement upon rights, but 
bases its decision on the relative merits of that infringement.49 
C.  Constitutional Interpretation in Practice 
There has been insufficient research into the descriptive interplay 
between interpretative methodologies and political behavior.  Comparative 
constitutional lawyers have studied the effect of different methods on 
jurisprudential outcomes,50 but seldom extend their analysis to how other 
political actors react to that methodology.  By contrast, political scientists 
tend to overlook jurisprudential choices. 51  Attitudinalists argue that 
constitutional court judges are relatively unconstrained and thus can pursue 
their policy preferences, using legal doctrine as a guise. 52  Strategic 
institutionalists focus on the court's relationship with the other branches of 
government as a constraint on judges’ ability to reach either their preferred 
policy or jurisprudential outcomes.53  Neither believes that law alone has a 
constraining effect on judicial behavior. 
Other disciplines have attempted to demonstrate that legal language 
can in fact constrain judges by influencing their perceptions on the extent of 
their discretion.  Psychological experiments on laypeople acting as jurors 
find no evidence that different standards of review make the jurors 
accordingly more or less likely to vote for conviction.54  Of course, judges—
or even lawyers—are socialized in law school and thus might treat legal 
standards differently from a layperson.  More recent research on U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal has found evidence that judicial panels tend to be more 
deferential towards agency decisions when applying the Chevron standard of 
review than when applying the more probing Skidmore test. 55   While 
                                                      
49  See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.R. 713 (Can.) (acknowledging that 
government regulations forcing shops to close on Sundays was a proportionate limitation on religious 
freedoms). 
50  See generally JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 43. 
51  See generally Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261 (2006); Christian 
Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European 
Integration, 2 EUROP. L. J. 105 (2009). 
52  Segal & Spaeth, supra note 9, at 973. 
53  See generally Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial 
Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 43, 43-63 (1999); Mario Bergara, Barak 
Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional 
Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 247-79 (2003); GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005). 
54  See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and 
Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 769, 775 (2000). 
55  In evaluating agency interpretations of statutes, the Skidmore test encourages judges to consider:  
1) the thoroughness of the agency's investigation; 2) the validity of its reasoning; 3) the consistency of its 
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standards of review are not equivalent to methods of constitutional 
interpretation, they do both require judges to constrain their discretion based 
on abstract legal standards.  Of course, we cannot read the minds of judges 
to know if they truly feel constrained by jurisprudential methodologies.  To 
obviate this problem, this article focuses on interpretative methods as 
presented in the judicial decisions themselves and tries to avoid speculating 
about the intent of the judges. 
Judges decide to adopt a method of constitutional interpretation in a 
variety of ways.  In some cases, the constitution itself simply mandates a 
particular standard of interpretation.56 In other cases, judges might borrow 
legal reasoning from a foreign constitutional court if they find it particularly 
persuasive.57 The choice of method might also depend on the individual 
judge’s political and legal socialization.  Increasingly, law students in 
America are exposed to and filtered into “originalist” or “living 
constitutionalist” camps.  Finally, the age of the constitution might matter in 
that courts interpreting a younger constitution might feel less concerned 
about uncovering the intent of the original constitutional drafters because 
they are of the same generation as those founders and implicitly understand 
their views.58 However, as constitutions age, legal norms and the meaning of 
words also change, which might prompt calls for a means to tether 
interpretation back to the intent of the founders.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
interpretation over time; and 4) any other persuasive powers of the agency.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134 (1944).  By contrast, under Chevron, judges are instructed to apply a two-step test:  1) has 
Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue; and 2) if not, is the agency’s construction of the 
statute permissible?  Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The latter test is designed to be much less 
intrusive into the agency decision-making process because agencies can reach permissible interpretations 
that might not necessarily be the “ideal” one.  The authors of the aforementioned study argued that Chevron 
constrains courts by giving judges in the minority of the panel who support deference greater leverage 
against the majority.  Morgan Hazelton et al., Panel Effects in Administrative Law: A Study of Rules, 
Standards and Judicial Whistleblowing, (Univ. of S. Cal., 2011). 
56  See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36; Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation (Isr.), supra note 47, at § 4. 
57  U.S. v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283 (Can.), citing Soering v. U.K., 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989). 
58  In fact, constitutional drafters might end up serving on the bench as judges.  In the American 
context, Founding Father John Jay also served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  WALTER STAHR, 
JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 273 (2005).  The first chief justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, 
Jimly Asshiddiqie, served on the legislature’s Expert Advisory Secretariat during that country’s transition 
from authoritarianism.  See Profile Judge Jimly Asshiddiqie, MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI REPUBLIK 
INDONESIA, http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilHakim&id=625 (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014). 
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III. THE DECLINE OF BURMESE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Myanmar does not have a long tradition of constitutionalism.  The 
country’s first Supreme Court could exercise constitutional review, but after 
the 1962 military coup the judiciary became subservient to the military.59 
Fifty years of military rule made the political elite wary of checks on 
government power.  This section briefly discusses the history of 
constitutionalism in Myanmar, including previous constitutions and judicial 
institutions.  It then summarizes the 2008 Constitution and the political 
reforms since the 2010 elections in order to provide context for the later 
impeachment of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
A.  Liberal Constitutional Spirit (1948-1962) 
Myanmar had a relatively sophisticated pre-colonial judicial system, 60 
but when Britain annexed the country in the 19th century, it implanted a 
common law legal system.61  In April 1947, with independence looming, 
Britain convened a constituent assembly in which Burmese politicians 
drafted a new constitution.62  However, the majority party, the Anti-Fascist 
People’s Freedom League (“AFPFL”), led by General Aung San, had little 
interest in Western constitutionalism and rule of law.63  It also failed to find a 
compromise that would satisfy the country’s ethnic minorities, several of 
which had been promised autonomy by the British. 64   Soon after the 
constitution went into effect, the Karen National Liberation Army and the 
Communist Party of Burma separately launched insurgencies against the 
Yangon government, nearly toppling it.65 
The 1947 Constitution is the only Myanmar constitution to grant a 
constitutional court meaningful independence.  Under Chapter VIII of the 
Constitution, the president appointed Supreme Court judges in consultation 
                                                      
59  Nick Cheesman, How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial 
Independence, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 801, 801-06 (2011). 
60  THANT MYINT-U, THE MAKING OF MODERN BURMA 87-88 (2001); see also Myint Zan, Woe Unto 
Ye Lawyers: Three Royal Orders Concerning Pleaders in Early Seventeenth-Century Burma, 44 AM. J. LEG. 
HIST. 40 (2000). 
61  Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards Toward the Past, 1 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2000). 
62  ROBERT H. TAYLOR, THE STATE IN MYANMAR 249 (2009). 
63  Aung San announced several basic principles for the constitution, including sovereignty, equality, 
democracy, and socialism, but notably did not mention the rule of law.  See MAUNG MAUNG, BURMA’S 
CONST. 81-82 (2d ed. 1961).  In fact, Dr Maung Maung later described the 1947 Constitution as a quick 
“cut and paste affair,” suggesting that the drafters focused on basic principles.  Maung Maung, Dr E Maung, 
in DR MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 243, 248 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008). 
64  SHELBY TUCKER, BURMA: CURSE OF INDEPENDENCE 120-21 (2001). 
65  Id. at 222. 
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with the Chief Justice of the Union and the Prime Minister, while Parliament 
could confirm or reject them, dividing the appointment power between two 
branches.66  Members of Parliament could hold an up-or-down vote, but by 
custom refrained from criticism of nominees.67  Furthermore, justices could 
be removed only for proved misbehavior or incapacity. 68   Parliament 
separated the lower courts from the civil service in order to insulate judges 
from executive influence.69  Judicial salaries were relatively high, especially 
compared to those of other government officials.70 
The 1947 Constitution explicitly authorized the Supreme Court to 
exercise constitutional review and prohibited any attempt to circumscribe its 
jurisdiction.71 The Supreme Court portrayed itself as a defender of individual 
liberty and interpreted the Constitution in a “large, liberal, and 
comprehensive spirit.”72  During the civil war after independence, the Court 
announced that the writ of habeas corpus could not be suspended, even 
during a state of emergency. 73  It even assumed authority to review 
presidential actions whenever he acted in a quasi-judicial manner.74 The 
Supreme Court established itself as a veto player in the new government by 
adopting the constitutional “construction most beneficial to the widest 
possible amplitude of [the court’s] powers.” 75  While the government 
frequently criticized these decisions, it did not violate the Court’s 
independence.76 
For Myanmar’s current opposition parties, the 1947 Constitution 
represents the high watermark of liberal constitutionalism.  However, as 
Yangon suffered from various political and military crises, many politicians 
saw the 1947 Constitution and constitutional review as contributing to, 
rather than solving, the country’s problems.  The military, including General 
                                                      
66  CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA, Sept. 24, 1947, ch. VIII, § 140 (Myan.) (repealed in 
1974) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (1947)]. 
67  Maung, supra note 63, at 147. 
68  MYAN. CONST. (1947), supra note 66, at ch. VIII. § 143. 
69  See Maung, supra note 63, at 156-57. 
70  The salaries for judges ranged from MMK 2500 for a High Court judge to MMK 3500 for the 
Supreme Court Chief Justice, compared to MMK 1700 for government ministers.  Maung Maung, The 
Search for Constitutionalism in Burma, in DR. MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 507, 
512-13 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008). 
71  MYAN. CONST. (1947), supra note 66, at ch. VIII. § 137.  The Supreme Court could also issue 
advisory opinions at the request of the president.  Id. At § 151(1). 
72  See U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v. U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.). 
73  Nick Cheesman, The Incongruous Return of Habeas Corpus to Myanmar, in RULING MYANMAR 
FROM CYCLONE NARGIS TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS 90, 95 (Nick Cheesman et al. eds., 2010). 
74  U San Win v The Secretary, Ministry of Judicial Affairs, [1957] B.L.R. 84 (Myan.). 
75  U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.). 
76  See Nick Cheesman, Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar? 82 PAC. AFF. 597, 600-01 
(2009-2010). 
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Ne Win, felt the Supreme Court under the 1947 Constitution was too 
independent.77  Other politicians accused the judiciary of being out of touch 
with the needs of the country and too focused on the interests of the private 
bar association.78  Dr. Maung Maung, who served as Chief Justice from 
1965-71 and later as Judicial Minister, criticized the pre-1962 judiciary for 
making Myanmar’s citizens more litigious and for favoring the “capitalist 
classes.”79 While the Supreme Court struck down many executive actions, it 
never declared a legislative act ultra vires,80 suggesting apprehensiveness 
about testing its power against the legitimacy of popularly elected 
representatives.  
B.  Socialist Constitutionalism (1962-1988) 
The Myanmar military (tatmadaw) became increasingly powerful 
during the late 1950s, when the AFPFL proved too polarized to govern 
effectively. 81  At Prime Minister U Nu’s request, the military briefly 
governed the country for eighteen months (1958-60).82 In February 1962, 
ethnic minority leaders from Shan and Kayah States met in Rangoon to 
discuss options for greater autonomy.83 On March 2, General Ne Win seized 
power and arrested Prime Minister U Nu, Chief Justice Myint Thein, and 
key ethnic minority leaders.84 Unlike the earlier caretaker administration, the 
new Revolutionary Council (“RC”) abolished most of the major institutions 
established under the 1947 Constitution.85 Ironically, the country’s ethnic 
insurgencies continued and even intensified.86 
                                                      
77  One of his main criticisms was that the constitution forbade the government from changing judges’ 
salaries without consent.  Zan, supra note 61, at 13. 
78  Historian J.S. Furnivall noted that given the Chief Justice’s influence on the judicial 
nomination process, all justices tended to be recruited from amongst the narrow legal elite, and as such, 
“the Bench tends to assume the character of a self-perpetuating closed corporation.”  See J.S. Furnivall, 
Foreword, in Maung, supra note 63, at ix–xi. 
79  MAUNG MAUNG, GENERAL LAW KNOWLEDGE (1975). 
80  Zan, supra note 61, at 15. 
81  See MARY CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA 184-88 (2005). 
82  Id. 
83  Some historians allege these states sought to secede from the Union and claim independence, an 
option they could exercise under Chapter X of the 1947 Constitution after 10 years.  MYAN. CONST. (1947), 
Sept. 24, 1947, ch. X. §§ 201-02 (Myan.) (repealed in 1974).  Also, at this time Prime Minister U Nu was 
considering nationalizing some of the military’s key industries and was thus threatening the military’s economic 
autonomy.  See DAVID. I. STEINBERG, BURMA: A SOCIALIST NATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 73-74 (1982). 
84  Myint Thein was imprisoned until 1968, several years longer than even U Nu.  Maung Maung, U 
Myint Thein, Chief Justice of the Union, in DR. MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 253–64 
(Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008). 
85  Zan, supra note 61, at 17-19. 
86  See generally TUCKER, supra note 64. 
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These developments boded ill for the judiciary.  As supreme leader, 
Ne Win proceeded to emasculate the judiciary.  On March 30, he abolished 
the Supreme and High Courts and replaced them with the Chief Court.87 Far 
from using constitutional review in a manner “beneficial to the widest 
possible amplitude of its power,”88 this new court allowed its power to issue 
writs and exercise judicial review fall into desuetude.89  The Chief Court 
rejected Myanmar’s British common law heritage by directing judges to 
accord greater priority to Buddhist Dhammathats, or law treatises, over 
British statutes. 90   The RC also established separate special criminal 
tribunals dominated by military appointees to hear politically sensitive 
cases.91  The Special Criminal Courts Appeal Court (“SCCAC”) rulings 
bound not only lower special criminal tribunals, but also the regular 
judiciary.92  At least one member of the SCCAC was also a member of the 
RC,93 effectively demolishing the barrier between the executive branch and 
the judiciary.  Overall, the new judicial system allowed the tatmadaw to 
consolidate its power and marginalize judges.94 
Far from a temporary expedient, the military used these special 
tribunals as a model for the rest of the judiciary.  In the early 1970s, the 
Revolutionary Council transferred authority to the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (“BSPP”) and promulgated the 1974 Constitution.95  The 
BSPP replaced the regular courts with a system of “People’s Courts,” which 
in turn resembled the special criminal tribunals.96  All judges were required 
to be members of the BSPP and they took guidance from BSPP Township 
Councils, rather than court’s legal advisors. 97  The 1974 Constitution 
explicitly required judges to “protect and safeguard the Socialist system.”98  
At the apex of the judicial system, the Constitution created the 
Council of People’s Justice (“CPJ”) to replace the Chief Court.99 This new 
institution was directly responsible to the Pyithu Hluttaw, the legislature, 
                                                      
87  Cheesman, supra note 59, at 807. 
88  U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v. U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.). 
89  See ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, Ne Win, Maung Maung and How to Drive a Legal System 
Crazy in Two Short Decades, 7 ARTICLE 2 15, 19–20 (2008) 
90  Andrew Huxley, The Last Fifty Years of Burmese Law: E Maung and Maung Maung, 1998 
LAWASIA 9, 16–17. 
91  See generally Cheesman, supra note 59.  
92  Maung Chit v. Union of Burma, [1972] B.L.R. (C.C.) 28 (Myan.). 
93  Zan, supra note 113, at 19. 
94  See generally Cheesman, supra note 59. 
95  DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA: THE STATE OF MYANMAR 106-07 (2001). 
96  See generally Cheesman, supra note 59, at 802, 808, & 817-818. 
97  CHRISTINA FINK, LIVING SILENCE IN BURMA: SURVIVING UNDER MILITARY RULE 35 (2009). 
98   MYAN. CONST. (1947), Sept. 24, 1947, ch. VII. § 101 (Myan.) (repealed in 1974).  
99  Cheesman, supra note 59, at 818. 
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and its members served in both bodies. 100  Burmese law prescribed no 
minimum qualifications for CPJ justices, and most were former generals;101 
during the first term, only one out of five CPJ members was a lawyer.102  
Ultimately, the Constitution permitted only the Pyithu Hluttaw to publish 
interpretations of the constitution.103  Although the Constitution provided for 
individual rights, these fell entirely outside the CPJ’s jurisdiction and there 
was no enforcement mechanism.104  In many cases, the judiciary also refused 
to enforce individual rights under statutory law105 and judges no longer 
accepted petitions for writs in criminal cases.106  
C.  Constitutional Void (1988-2010) 
By the summer of 1988, the BSPP regime faced widespread protests 
in response to economic hardships caused by a massive devaluation of the 
currency.107  The democratic opposition began to rally behind Aung San Suu 
Kyi, daughter of General Aung San, and her National League for Democracy 
(“NLD”) party.108  On September 18, the tatmadaw, fearing the BSPP had 
lost control of the country, seized power.109  This new junta, the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (“SLORC”), initially presented itself as an 
interim government and announced elections for May 1990.110 However, 
when the NLD won over eighty percent of the seats, the SLORC refused to 
hand over power and instead announced that the results would be used to 
form a National Convention to draft a new constitution, not a parliament.111  
Soon after taking power, the SLORC—later the State Peace and 
Development Council (“SPDC”)—declared martial law and announced that 
it was “not bound by any Constitution.”112  Between June 1988 and March 
                                                      
100  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA Jan. 3, 1974, ch. V, § 73(d) & ch. VII, § 104 
(Myan.) (repealed in 2008) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (1974)]. 
101 See id. at ch. V, § 73(d), ch. VII; see also Council of People’s Justices Law, 1974, No. 13/1974 
(Myan.). 
102  Zan, supra note 61, at 23. 
103  MYAN. CONST. (1974), supra note 100, at ch. XVI, § 200(c). 
104  Cheesman, supra note 73, at 96.  
105  For example, the Safeguarding Citizens’ Rights Law, 1975, No. 2/1975 (Myan.) allowed citizens 
to lodge complaints against state officers but, it does not appear that any cases were ever brought under this 
law. Cheesman, supra note 73, at 108-09 n.15. 
106  Id. at 96.  The People’s Courts system was plagued with other problems as well, including 
corruption and massive case backlog.  TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 339-42.  
107  STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 4-12. 
108  JUSTIN WINTLE, PERFECT HOSTAGE: A LIFE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI, BURMA'S PRISONER OF 
CONSCIENCE 287-93 (2008). 
109  Id. at 282. 
110  TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 393. 
111  Id. at 395-414. 
112  State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1990, No. 1/1990 (Myan.). 
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1989, the military closed the courts and replaced them with military 
tribunals in order to try political cases.113  Like its predecessor, once the 
SLORC consolidated power, it relied less on military tribunals and more on 
ordinary courts.  On September 26, it formally abolished the People’s Courts 
and appointed professional judges.114  The SLORC appointed five justices to 
the new Supreme Court, including former court Registrar U Aung Toe as the 
Chief Justice.115  In the lower courts, the SLORC replaced lay judges with 
professional lawyers.116  Under a revised version of the Judiciary Law 
published in 2000, the Supreme Court also gained responsibility for 
appointing lower court judges.117  
The SLORC restored the pre-1962 judicial system in form, but not in 
spirit.  Although § 2(a) of the Judiciary Law nominally protected judicial 
independence,118 the junta dismissed judges without formal impeachment 
proceedings on multiple occasions.119  The lack of judicial independence 
undermined the right to a fair trial; according to Steinberg, “[t]rials [were] 
usually secret, sentences perversely long (and extendable at the state’s 
command), and prison conditions deplorable.”120  The Myanmar Code of 
Criminal Procedure nominally ensures judicial oversight of arrests,121 but 
former political prisoners claimed that they lacked an opportunity to 
challenge lawfulness of their arrest, much less enforce their constitutional 
                                                      
113  K.S. VENKATESWARAN, ARTICLE XIX: BURMA BEYOND THE LAW 26–29 (1996). 
114  State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 1988, No. 2/1988 (Myan.). 
115  State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1988, No. 5/1988 (Myan.). 
116  TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 452–53. 
117  State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 2000, No. 5/2000, ch. VI, § 13 
(Myan.). 
118  Id. at ch. II, § 2(a). 
119  In 1988, the SLORC dismissed 62 judges for failing to imprison political prisoners to terms longer 
than the sentences prescribed by statute.  State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1988, No. 
5/1988; BURMA LAWYERS’ COUNCIL, BURMA JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: CONTRIBUTION FOR THE 58TH 
SESSION OF THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/ 
obl/docs/chr2002briefing-judicial.htm; ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA 12 (1990).  On November 
14, 1998, 64 judges, including five Supreme Court justices, were “permitted to retire.”  State Peace and 
Development Council Order, 1998, No. A.0694(I)/1998 (Myan.). 
In 2009 Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, bluntly stated:  
“There is no independent and impartial judiciary system.”  UN Rights Envoy Says Burma's Judiciary 
System Flawed, MIZZIMA NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008, http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/world/1291-un-rights-
envoy-says-burmas-judiciary-system-flawed.html; see also Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, United Nations Human Rights Comm’n, Progress Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Mar.  10,  2010,  U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/48 
(2010), ¶ 42 (by Tomás Ojea Quintana); Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Aug. 24, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/64/318 (2009), ¶¶ 22, 36-37 (by Tomás 
Ojea Quintana). 
120  DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA/MYANMAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 130 (2013). 
121  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, ch. V, §§ 60–61 (Myan.). 
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rights.122  Furthermore, judges could use their contempt power in order to 
compel lawyers who defended political prisoners to instruct their clients not 
to resist the proceedings.123  Amnesty International even reported that in 
sensitive cases judges took sentencing instructions directly from Military 
Intelligence officers.124  
D.  Drafting the Constitution (1990-2008) 
Some of the winners from the May 1990 election joined the National 
Convention, but the SLORC diluted their voice by appointing hundreds of 
delegates to “represent” interest groups, such as peasants, workers and 
ethnic minorities.125  When the convention began in January 1993, only 99 
of the 702 delegates had been elected.126  The entire process was plagued 
with irregularities.127  Delegates’ statements had to be preapproved by the 
chairman and they were not allowed to criticize the draft constitution.128  In 
1995, the NLD boycotted the convention, and the SLORC adjourned it the 
following year.129 
The constitution-drafting process accelerated in the mid-2000s after 
several high-profile confrontations between the government and the 
opposition.  In May 2003, the SPDC faced political crisis when a group of 
thugs attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade at Depayin.130  In response, 
then-Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced a “seven-step roadmap to 
democracy” and reconvened the National Convention the following year.131  
                                                      
122  AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: GRAVE AND ABIDING CONCERNS 
(2004). Obviously, without a constitution, the Supreme Court did not have the power of constitutional 
review.  Nor could it issue writs.  Cheesman, supra note 73, at 97-98.  Section 5(h) of the Judiciary Law 
implied that the Court could examine administrative orders and decisions that infringe on individual rights, 
but in practice it never attempted to exercise this power.  See generally TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 452-53. 
123  See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar, supra note 119, at ¶ 35. 
124  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 122, at 18.  The Supreme Court even went so far as to hold that judges 
presiding over trials inside prison did not possess the authority to decide who could attend hearings.  Joseph 
Allchin, Burma Snatches Power from Judges, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Feb. 23, 2011, 
http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-snatches-power-from-judges/14402. 
125  TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 487. 
126  FINK, supra note 97, at 74. 
127  For example, the SLORC passed a law punishing criticism of the National Convention with up to 
20 years’ imprisonment.  The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer of State Responsibility 
and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the National Convention against Disturbances and 
Oppositions, 1996, No. 5/1996, ch. II, § 3 (Myan.). 
128  FINK, supra note 97, at 73-77. 
129  Id. at 77. 
130  Id. at 94. 
131  The entire seven-step roadmap includes:  1) reconvening the National Convention; 2) 
implementation of the process “for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system”; 3) 
drafting a Constitution; 4) adopting the Constitution via a referendum; 5) holding legislative elections; 6) 
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In September 2007, at the same time the government cracked down on the 
Saffron Revolution, a protest led by Buddhist monks, the convention 
released a draft of the “State Fundamental Principles.”132  In February 2008, 
a fifty-four-member drafting commission produced the final draft 
constitution based almost exactly on those principles.133  
The SPDC scheduled a constitutional referendum for early May 
2008.134  However, on May 2-3, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy Delta 
region and killed approximately 140,000 Burmese.135  The SPDC postponed 
the referendum in the cyclone-hit areas until May 24, while the rest of the 
country voted as scheduled on May 10.136  According to government figures, 
an astounding 98.12% of voters turned out and 92.48% voted in favor of the 
new constitution.137  However, there were widespread charges of electoral 
irregularities and vote rigging during the referendum.138  Many of the armed 
ethnic insurgent groups rejected the constitution, claiming that it did not 
provide sufficient autonomy for local governments. 139   The 2008 
Constitution was thus adopted under inauspicious circumstances, a legacy 
that would undermine its legitimacy even after the political transition. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
convening the legislature; and 7) forming the government and other constitutional bodies.  TAYLOR, supra 
note 62, at 491–92. 
132  The Fundamental Principles and Detailed Basic Principles, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 10, 
2007. 
133  Commission Approves Draft of the State Constitution, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 20, 2008, 
at 16.  While the drafting process nominally took over fifteen years, as with much else in Myanmar, what 
actually happened remains obscure.  According to some sources, Dr. Maung Maung—constitutional law 
scholar, alleged drafter of the 1974 Constitution, and former chief justice, attorney-general and president—
drafted much of the current constitution before his death in 1994.  INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 174, 
MYAN.: TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS 8 (2009).  Indeed, by the mid-1990s, many of the basic principles of the 
constitution had already been drafted.  The New Light of Myanmar published excerpts of proceedings when 
the National Convention was in session.  For relevant examples, see generally BURMA PRESS SUMMARY VOLS. 
VII(1)-X(4) (Jan. 1993-Apr. 1996), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=1455& 
lo=d&sl=0. 
134  Approval of the Constitution Draft will be Sought in a National Referendum to be Held in May 
2008, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 11, 2008. 
135  TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, POST-NARGIS PERIODIC REVIEW III ix (2010). 
136  VORAVIT SUWANVANICHKIJ ET AL., AFTER THE STORM: VOICES FROM THE DELTA 54 (2009). 
137  Id. at 66. 
138  STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 144-45.  See generally PUBLIC INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., BURMA’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM: NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR (2008), available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/PILPG_Report_Burmese_Constitutional_Referendum_Neither_Free_N
or_Fair-11_May_2008.pdf. 
139  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5. 
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E.  The 2008 Constitution 
The 2008 Constitution revived some of the democratic structures of 
the 1947 Constitution, but with notable differences.  The Pyihtaungsu 
Hluttaw (Union Legislature) contains two houses, the Pyithu (People’s 
chamber) with 440 members and the Amyotha (Nationalities chamber) with 
224 members.140 All members have five-year terms, coterminous with those 
of the president. 141  However, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar 
Defense Services has the authority to appoint a quarter of all Hluttaw 
members.142  Legislative schedules divide jurisdiction between the Union 
and state or region hluttaws.143  The Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw retains authority 
over defense, security, foreign affairs, and judicial administration, as well as 
the centralized budget, while each state/region controls local finance and 
projects.144  
In the executive branch, the president is selected by an electoral 
college composed of members of the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Amyotha Hluttaw, 
and all tatmadaw MPs.  Each group chooses a candidate, one of whom is 
elected by the entire Hluttaw as president, with the other two as vice-
presidents.145  The President appoints not only Union ministers, but also the 
state/region chief ministers, cabinet ministers, and advocates-general.146  The 
Constitution instructs the Hluttaw to give deference to the President’s 
nominees unless they do not meet the professional criteria listed in the 
Constitution.147  The President also serves as chairperson of the National 
Defense and Security Council (“NDSC”), which has the authority to declare 
a state of emergency.148  However, the President does not control all the 
levers of power, and does not even have the ability to veto legislation.149 
The 2008 Constitution largely confirms the previous institutional 
structure of the judiciary, with a few exceptions.  As before, the Supreme 
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts for each 
state/region, as well as subordinate District and Township Courts.150  The 
text of the Constitution appears vague and contradictory with regard to 
                                                      
140  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, ch. IV, §§ 109, 
141 (Myan.) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (2008)]. 
141  Id. at § 119. 
142  Id. at §§ 109(b) and 141(b). 
143  Id. at Schedules I, II.  There are seven states and seven regions.  Id. at ch. II, § 49.  
144  Id. at Schedules I, II. 
145  Id. at ch. III, § 60. 
146  Id. at ch. V, § 232. 
147  See, e.g., id. at ch. VI, § 323(d). 
148  Id. at ch. XI, § 410. 
149  Id. at ch. IV, §§ 105-06. 
150   Id. at ch. VI, §§ 314-16. 
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judicial independence.  Section 11 states that the judiciary should 
“administer justice independently according to law.” 151   However, in 
explaining the separation of powers, it states that the judiciary is separate “to 
the extent possible.”152  The low impeachment threshold could also pose a 
threat to judicial independence.  A quarter of Hluttaw members from either 
chamber can initiate impeachment proceedings, 153 giving the military 
sufficient votes to impeach any judge.  The grounds for impeachment 
include potentially subjective terms such as “inefficient discharge of duties” 
and “breach of the constitution.”154  
Aside from the formal branches of government, Chapter VII of the 
Constitution grants considerable powers to the military (tatmadaw).  While 
the president appoints the commander-in-chief, his choice is subject to 
NDSC approval. 155  Once ensconced, the commander-in-chief is secure 
because the Constitution does not stipulate any limits on his term in office or 
provisions for his removal. 156   Moreover, the Constitution allows the 
Defense Services to “independently administer and adjudicate” all matters 
pertaining to the armed forces,157 which critics allege potentially removes 
legislative or judicial oversight.158  
Finally, Chapter VIII of the Constitution lists fundamental rights and 
duties, most of which are civil and political rights.  Significantly, it 
reintroduces habeas corpus for the first time in two generations.159  Between 
March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2013, the Supreme Court received 432 
petitions for writs, of which 286 were rejected, and of which 84 were 
pending.160  However, many fundamental rights are subject to extensive 
restrictions, such as “security, prevalence of law and order, community peace 
and tranquility or public order and morality,”161 which could undermine the 
underlying right.  The constitution also includes social and economic rights, 
such as education and health,162 but it is unclear if these are justiciable.163  
                                                      
151  Id. at ch. I, § 19(a). 
152  Id. at § 11(a). 
153  Id. at ch. III, § 71(b) - VI, § 302(c). 
154  Id. at ch. VI, § 302(a). 
155  Id. at ch. VII, § 342. 
156  See id. 
157  Id. at ch. I, § 20(b). 
158  GHAI, supra note 5, at 27.  
159  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 296 (Myan.); see also Cheesman, supra note 73, at 
109. 
160  Chief Justice of the Union Stresses Important Role of Courts in Ensuring Rule of Law, THE NEW 
LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 9, 2013, at 8. 
161  MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. VIII, § 354. 
162  Id. at §§ 366(a) & 367. 
163  Economic and social rights in constitutions have often been held to be non-justiciable.  MARK V. 
TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN 
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Critics have frequently condemned the process for amending the 
Constitution.164 Under Chapter XII, constitutional amendments require the 
support of seventy-five percent of each chamber, 165  which affords the 
tatmadaw bloc an effective veto.166  For some provisions, including many of 
the basic principles, a referendum is required.167  Critics have attacked this as 
the military’s attempt to straightjacket future democratic governments.168 
While there are currently attempts to amend the Constitution (discussed 
below),  the high barrier to amendment has indeed made political 
reconciliation more difficult as certain provisions of the Constitution have 
become major sources of contention. 
F.  Transition to Democracy? (2010 and Onward) 
On November 7, 2010, the government held elections for the new 
Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw and the state/regional legislatures. 169   The NLD 
boycotted the elections entirely because Aung San Suu Kyi was still under 
house arrest and party leaders believed the elections would be neither free 
nor fair.170  In addition to restrictions on campaigning, many opposition 
groups alleged that the government-backed Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (“USDP”) relied on suspicious “advance votes” to tip 
the balance in its favor.171  Other observers reported widespread vote buying 
                                                                                                                                                                 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241 (2007).  Recently, however, some constitutional courts have 
begun to interpret such rights as enforceable.  The South African Constitutional Court has led the way in 
developing a jurisprudential approach based on the reasonableness of the government’s implementation of 
economic and social rights. See, e.g,, Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South 
Africa, (Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12, 2001), available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context=public_law_and_legal_the
ory; Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11 CONST. FORUM 123 (2000-
2001).  However, nothing in Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indicates that these rights are enforceable.  See 
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. VIII.  In fact, the Constitution provides such rights “in accord 
with [educational or health] policy,” Id. at §§ 366 and 367, giving the legislature considerable discretion.  
164  Williams, supra note 5, at 1669; GHAI, supra note 5, at 36; see also Htet Aung, An Alternative 
Solution to Amend the Constitution, THE IRRAWADDY, May 14, 2010, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article. 
php?art_id=17916. 
165  MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. XII, §§ 433–36. 
166  Kay Latt, Opposition-Backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult, THE IRRAWADDY, Sept. 
14, 2009, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16775&page=1. 
167  MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. XII, § 436(a). 
168  See Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., Burma’s Constitution: Straightjacket or Red Herring?, NEW MANDALA 
BLOG, Feb. 29, 2012, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/02/29/burma’s-constitution-
straightjacket-or-red-herring/. 
169  STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 188-92. 
170  Id. at 190-91; see generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 118: MYANMAR’S POST-
ELECTION LANDSCAPE (2011).  
171  See, e.g., Htet Aung, Those Shadowy Advance Votes, THE IRRAWADDY, Dec., 2010, 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20383.  
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and intimidation.172  In the end, the USDP won around seventy-eight percent 
of all contested seats.173  The Hluttaw elected former general and prime 
minister Thein Sein as president and former general Thura Shwe Mann as 
speaker of the legislature.174  
To the surprise of many observers, Myanmar’s elites did not simply 
trade in their military uniforms for business suits, but rather took genuine yet 
gradual steps towards reform.175 President Thein Sein relaxed censorship, 
pursued currency reform, released hundreds of political prisoners, and 
suspended construction of the unpopular Myitsoe Dam in Kachin State.176 
The government has also negotiated ceasefire agreements with many of the 
remaining ethnic insurgent groups, including the Karen National Union, 
putting an end to the fifty-year civil war.177 Under Speaker Shwe Mann’s 
leadership, the Hluttaw has become much more than a rubber-stamp for the 
military’s agenda. 178  The legislature has passed dozens of new laws, 
including legislation legalizing trade unions and permitting public 
protests. 179  Shwe Mann has even formed oversight committees and 
encouraged opposition MPs to propose bills.180 For its part, the military has 
largely refrained from dominating policy debates. 181  The military MPs 
seldom vote as a unified bloc and often vote against the USDP.182  
In August 2011, President Thein Sein reached a détente with Aung 
San Suu Kyi, who had been released shortly after the elections.183 She 
announced that she believed the president’s commitment to reform and 
                                                      
172  Jack Davies & Haroon Siddique, Burma Election Observers Report Voter Intimidation, THE 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/08/burma-election-voter-
intimidation.  
173  Figures of Multiparty Democracy General Elections for Respective Hluttaws Announced, NEW 
LIGHT OF MYAN., Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.burmanet.org/news/2010/12/08/new-light-of-myanmar-figures-
of-multiparty-democracy-general-elections-for-respective-hluttaws-announced/.  
174  Meeting of Group of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Representatives-Elect of Presidential Electoral College 
held U Thein Sein Elected as President, Thiha Thura U Tin Aung Myint Oo, Dr. Sai Mauk Kham (a) 
Maung Ohn as Vice-Presidents, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 5, 2011, at 1. 
175 INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 127: MYANMAR: MAJOR REFORM UNDERWAY (2011); INT’L 
CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 214: MYANMAR: A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE (2011); INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA 
BRIEFING NO. 136: REFORM IN MYANMAR: ONE YEAR ON (2012). 
176  Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., Discipline-Flourishing Constitutional Review: A Legal and Political 
Analysis of Myanmar's New Constitutional Tribunal, 12 AUSTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 1 (2011). 
177  Burma Government Signs Ceasefire With Karen Rebels, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16523691. 
178  See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 142: NOT A RUBBER STAMP: MYANMAR’S 
LEGIS. IN A TIME OF TRANSITION (2013). 
179  Id. at 9-13. 
180  Id. at 6. 
181  Id. at 6-8. 
182  Id. 
183  ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dissident Meets Leader of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/world/asia/20myanmar.html?_r=0. 
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agreed to participate in the political process.184 On April 1, the NLD ran 
candidates in forty-four by-elections and won forty-three seats, compared to 
the USDP’s single victory.185 Aung San Suu Kyi became chairperson for the 
Pyithu Hluttaw Committee for Rule of Law, Peace, and Tranquility, which 
has jurisdiction over general questions of the rule of law and judicial 
reform.186  While the NLD has been critical of some aspects of government 
policy, as of 2014 it appears committed to working through the legislature.187 
In early 2013, the legislature established a 109-member Constitutional 
Review Joint Committee to study proposed amendments, with fifty-two 
members from the USDP, twenty-five from the military, and seven from the 
NLD (all eighteen political parties in the legislature have at least one MP).188  
The Committee received over 300,000 suggestions from political parties, 
NGOs, legal experts, and government officials.189  Most of the suggestions 
have focused on the Constitution’s basic principles and the process for 
amending the Constitution.190  For its part, the NLD has demanded that the 
ban on presidential candidates with foreign dependents 191  be removed, 
especially because Daw Suu’s children are British citizens and she has 
announced her intention to compete for the presidency in 2015.192  It has also 
proposed eliminating the military’s role in the legislature.193  Further, the 
USDP has proposed making district and township administrators directly 
elected and chief ministers appointed by each state/regional legislature rather 
                                                      
184  Larry Jagan, What Thein Sein Promised Suu Kyi, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MI30Ae01.html.  
185  Dean Nelson, Burma Elections: President Thein Sein Happy with Result, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 3, 
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9183220/Burma-elections-
President-Thein-Sein-happy-with-result.html. 
186  Min Lwin, Suu Kyi to Head ‘Rule of Law’ Committee, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Aug. 8, 
2012, http://www.dvb.no/news/suu-kyi-to-head-‘rule-of-law’-committee/23217. 
187  See, e.g., Simon Roughneen, NLD to Probe Thein Sein’s USDP Role, THE IRRAWADDY, Oct. 19, 
2012, http://www.irrawaddy.org/nld/nld-to-probe-thein-seins-usdp-role.html. 
188  Soe Than Lin & Min Min, Suu Kyi Cautions Constitution Review Joint Committee, MIZZIMA 
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2013, http://mizzima.com/mizzima-news/politics/item/10607-suu-kyi-cautions-constitution 
-review-joint-committee.  
189  Soe Than Linn & Nyan Hlaing Linn, Constitution Review Panel to Meet Deadline, Say MPs, 
MIZZIMA NEWS, Jan. 17, 2014, http://mizzima.com/mizzima-news/politics/item/10864-constitution-review-
panel-to-meet-deadline-say-mps.  
190  Ei Ei Toe Lwin, Constitution Committee will not Vote on Suggestions, THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2014, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9271-constitution-committee-will-not-vote-on-
suggestions.html.  
191  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. III, § 59(f ) (Myan.). 
192  Hilary Whiteman, Myanmar's Suu Kyi: 'I Want to Run for President', CNN, June 6, 2013, http:// 
www.cnn.com/2013/06/06/world/asia/myanmar-suu-kyi-presidential-aspiration/. 
193  Shwe Aung, 150 Constitutional Clauses Should be Amended, Says NLD, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF 
BURMA, Dec. 27, 2013, http://www.dvb.no/news/150-constitutional-clauses-should-be-amended-says-nld-
burma-myanmar/35593.  
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than by the president, partly as an attempt to satisfy ethnic minority 
parties.194  
As of January 31, 2014, the Committee report proposed more limited 
changes, but its report is not binding upon the rest of the legislature.195 
Indeed, Speaker Shwe Mann released a statement calling upon the 
legislature to consider reforming the military’s role to conform to democratic 
principles.196 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL & JURISPRUDENCE 
 The 2008 Constitution reintroduced the concept of constitutional 
review, but vested that power in a new Constitutional Tribunal rather than a 
Supreme Court.197 This section provides an overview of the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s structure and powers.  It then analyzes the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudential reasoning in all five of the decisions it issued.  In 
adjudicating a dispute between the president and legislature, the Tribunal 
announced that legislative committees did not have constitutional status.  
This section concludes by discussing the ensuing backlash and impeachment 
of the Tribunal members.  
A.  Constitutional Tribunal Structure & Powers 
The Constitutional Tribunal has authority to “vet” legislation and 
executive orders for conformity with the Constitution. 198   It can also 
adjudicate disputes between various government actors.199  The Constitution 
does not prescribe a standard of review or method of constitutional 
interpretation.  However, it does clearly state that “[t]he resolution of the 
Constitutional Tribunal of the Union shall be final and conclusive,” meaning 
that any laws the Tribunal finds unconstitutional should immediately 
become null and void without the need for further action from the 
legislature.200 
                                                      
194  Htet Naing Zaw, USDP Announces Surprise Constitutional Amendment Proposal, THE 
IRRAWADDY, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/usdp-announces-surprise-constitutional-
amendment-proposal.html.  
195  Lawi Weng, Burma Parliament Committee: Keep Main Points of Constitution, THE IRRAWADDY, 
Jan. 31, 2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-parliament-committee-keep-main-points-
constitution.html. 
196  Office of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, The Basic Principles For the Implementation Committee, 2014, at 
§ B(2) (Myan.) (Thura Shwe Mann, Speaker). 
197  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 322(b)-(c) (Myan.). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. at § 322(d)-(e). 
200  Id. at § 324; see also Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI (Myan.) (The State Peace 
and Development Council Law).  In describing the Constitutional Tribunal’s powers, the English-language 
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The Constitutional Tribunal is composed of nine members, including a 
chairperson, each appointed for five-year terms. 201   The president and 
speakers of both chambers of the Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw each 
choose three justices, subject to confirmation by the entire legislature.202 
Tribunal nominees must be at least fifty years old, and must have served for 
at least five years as a judge on the High Court; ten years as a judicial 
officer; twenty years as an advocate; or an eminent jurist “in the opinion of 
the President.”203  This last criterion affords the president relatively broad 
discretion in selecting nominees because there is no definition of “eminent 
jurist.”204  In addition, members must be “loyal to the Union” and have a 
“political, administrative, economic, and security outlook.”205  This provision 
is not immediately clear, but appears designed to allow the government to 
evaluate a candidate’s political ideology and career experience. 
Direct standing before the Tribunal is limited to several senior 
government officials, including the president, speakers of each Pyihtaungsu 
Hluttaw chamber, and chief justice of the Supreme Court.206  In addition, 
state/regional chief ministers and legislative speakers, as well as ten percent 
of the Hluttaw, can submit questions in accord with “certain procedures.”207 
Non-governmental actors do not have standing to petition the Tribunal 
directly.208  It seems possible for citizens to use § 323 to get a case 
containing constitutional questions referred by the ordinary courts to the 
Tribunal chief justice, 209 but this has not yet occurred.  However, because 
judges possess discretion in making such referrals, there is a risk that they 
would deny petitions by claiming that the dispute can be resolved without 
answering any constitutional questions.  The 2010 Constitutional Tribunal 
Law appears to grant the Constitutional Tribunal Chief Justice significant 
                                                                                                                                                                 
version of the “State Fundamental Principles” uses the term “scrutinize,” whereas the final draft uses “vet.”  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the former merely means to examine closely, while the latter 
means to check a subject’s authority or suitability—implying considerably stronger powers.  Compare 
Scrutinize, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/173774?redirected 
From=scrutinize (last visited May 24, 2014), with Vet, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/222953?rskey=NhhEZC&result=3&isAdvanced=false (last visited May 
24, 2014).  The Burmese-language versions both use the same word—sie zit—so the English change does 
not affect the legal meaning, but possibly demonstrates the drafters’ desire to enhance the tribunal’s authority, 
at least for English-language audiences.  The two versions are otherwise identical with respect to the tribunal. 
201  MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 197, at ch. VI, § 335. 
202  Id. at § 321. 
203  Id. at § 333. 
204  See id. at § 333(d)(iv). 
205  Id. at § 333(h)-(g). 
206  Id. at § 325. 
207  Id. at § 326. 
208  See id. at §§ 325, 326. 
209  Id. at § 323. 
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agenda-setting powers in such cases because it instructs him to submit his 
opinion on such cases to the other members.210 
As with the ordinary judiciary, the impeachment threshold is relatively 
low.  Either the president or a quarter of either Hluttaw chamber can initiate 
impeachment proceedings against Tribunal members for “high treason,” 
“misconduct” or even “inefficient discharge of duties.”211 There is also some 
ambiguity as to whether or not the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial 
independence extends to the Tribunal.  Like the President and legislators but 
unlike judges, the Tribunal members serve for only five-year terms.212 The 
Constitution uses the Burmese word khone yone (specialized court) to 
describe the Tribunal, rather than taya hluttaw (court of justice), the term 
used for the ordinary courts.  The Constitution also does not list the Tribunal 
amongst institutions sharing “judicial power.”213  In earlier drafts of the 
Constitution, the provisions for the Tribunal were even separated from those 
for the rest of the judiciary, although by 2008 they were moved to the 
chapter on the judiciary (Chapter VI).214  
As noted above, knowledge about the actual process of drafting the 
2008 Constitution remains limited.  It is not clear why the military elite 
acceded to the inclusion of a constitutional court, or indeed if they even 
understood the risks of constitutional review.215  Official proceedings from 
the National Convention tend to be either unenlightening or restate the 
obvious.  U Tin Sein of Pyay Township in Bago Division, representative of 
“workers,” explained that “[the Constitutional Tribunal] is a must for 
                                                      
210  Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI, § 17 (Myan.) (The State Peace and 
Development Council Law). 
211  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 334 (Myan.). 
212  Id. at § 335. 
213  The Basic Principles of the 2008 Constitution state:  “The judicial power of the Union is shared 
among the Supreme Court of the Union, High Courts of the Regions, High Courts of the States and courts 
of different levels, including Courts of Self-Administered Areas.”  See id. at ch. I, § 18(a).  
214  In the “State Fundamental Principles,” provisions on the Constitutional Tribunal fell under the 
chapter on General Provisions (Chapter XV).  Only in late 2007 did the National Convention’s Constitution 
Drafting Commission move the provisions on the Tribunal to the same chapter as the judiciary (Chapter 
VI).  It remains unclear why the Commission did this, although even in the final draft the provisions for the 
Tribunal are separated by a different heading.  Compare The Fundamental Principles and Detailed Basic 
Principles, supra note 132, with MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 211, at ch. VI. 
215  While the author has heard several interesting rumors while in Yangon, these generally lack 
concrete evidence.  One rumor is that the lawyers drafting the 2008 Constitution separated the 
Constitutional Tribunal from the Supreme Court in order to create more patronage opportunities for the 
legal profession.  Proponents point out that the Constitution requires judges and certain other officeholders 
to possess law degrees.  Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (June 3, 2010).  However, this 
seems dubious on several counts.  First, the professional criteria are similar to and most likely copied from 
the 1947 Constitution.  Second, if the Constitutional Tribunal had been primarily designed for patronage, 
then life tenure (or at least lengthy terms) would have been more appropriate.  The current five-year term 
provides little job security.  Finally, the drafters could have pursued similar (if not better) patronage 
opportunities by expanding the membership of the Supreme Court. 
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ensuring perpetual existence of the State Constitution.”216  This suggests that 
he, and in turn other drafters, considered a constitutional court important for 
the success of the Constitution itself, perhaps referencing the widely held 
belief that constitutional review makes constitutions more responsive to 
change.217 Unfortunately, U Tin Sein does not elaborate on his comment. 
Other comments at the National Convention stressed the dispute-
resolution function of the Constitutional Tribunal.  U Sein Kyi, a convention 
representative on behalf of “intellectuals and intelligentsia,” predicted the 
Tribunal would handle political disputes about the meaning of the 
Constitution, which he claims justifies the requirement that Tribunal 
members possess a background in political, administrative, and security 
affairs.218 Along these lines, he argues that allowing senior government 
officials to submit abstract questions to the Tribunal is “appropriate because 
they are the heads of respective organizations.”219  
Such statements indicate that the drafters viewed the Tribunal as a 
forum in which to resolve intra-governmental disputes, not as a means for 
citizens to check the government.  It is notable that none of the delegates 
justified the Tribunal as necessary to protect fundamental rights.  It seems 
particularly likely that the drafters viewed the Tribunal as a means through 
which to police jurisdictional boundaries in the new government, especially 
between the Union government and the new state/regional governments.220 
The Constitution contains legislative schedules delineating Union and 
state/regional jurisdiction, but several provisions remain ambiguous.221                              
On February 5, 2011, the Hluttaw confirmed the nine Constitutional 
Tribunal members.222 The three members nominated by the president were U 
Thein Soe, Dr Tin Aung Aye, and Daw Khin Hla Myint.223 The three 
chosen by the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw were U Tun Kyi, U Soe 
                                                      
216  Delegate Group of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia at the Plenary Session of the National 
Convention Held at Pyidaungsu Hall, Nyaunghnapin Camp, Hmawby Township, Yangon Division (28 
December 2006), THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Jan. 1, 2007, at 10. 
217  See ELKINS, supra note 13, at 106-09. 
218  Delegate Group of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia at the Plenary Session of the National 
Convention held at Pyidaungsu Hall, Nyaunghnapin Camp, Hmawby Township, Yangon Division (28 
December 2006), supra note 216. 
219  Id.  
220  Nardi, supra note 176, at 24; see generally JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: 
PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 119-25 (2008) (explaining how courts help police boundaries of federal 
jurisdictions). 
221  For example, state and regional governments have jurisdiction over “small business loans,” but the 
threshold for a loan to be considered small is not defined in the Constitution.  See MYAN. CONST. (2008), 
May 29, 2008, Schedules II(1)(k), (Myan.). 
222  Fourth-day Regular Session of First Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Held, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 
12, 2011, at 9, 16. 
223  Id. 
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Thein, and U Khin Tun.224 Finally, the three nominated by the Speaker of the 
Amyotha Hluttaw were U Hsan Myint, U Myint Kyaing, and Daw Mi Mi Yi.  
All nine were confirmed with no objections.225 Thein Soe had been the 
chairperson of the Elections Commission during the November 2010 
elections and was appointed to head the Tribunal. 226  
B.  Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence 
The next five sections (Sections IV.B.1-5) analyze the jurisprudential 
reasoning in each of the five cases the Constitutional Tribunal heard between 
March 2011 and August 2012.  The Tribunal members primarily used 
textualist or originalist approaches to interpreting the Constitution.  
However, after the backlash from a controversial decision regarding the 
status of legislative committees, the Tribunal seemed to adopt a balancing 
test in its final decision. 
1. Chief Justice v. Ministry of Home Affairs 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s first case, Chief Justice v. Ministry of 
Home Affairs, focused on the extent of the 2008 Constitution’s guarantee of 
judicial independence in § 11.227 The Ministry of Home Affairs (“MHA”) 
attempted to confer first class judicial power 228  on twenty-seven sub-
township administrative officials, allowing them to try criminal cases.229 The 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court claimed that creating judgeships based in 
                                                      
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  Soe Than Lynn & Shwe Yinn Mar Oo, Members of Constitutional Tribunal Nominated, List of 
Ministers Approved, THE MYAN. TIMES, Feb. 14-20, 2011, http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/ 
news/562/news56203.html.  The other members’ backgrounds are: 
Tin Aung Aye (Former Economic Institute Director); 
Khin Hla Myint (Supreme Court Crime Department Director); 
Tun Kyi (Retired Supreme Court Director); 
Soe Thein (Retired Supreme Court Director); 
Khin Tun (Retired Supreme Court Director); 
Hsan Myint (Revenue Appeals Court Director); 
Myint Kyaing (Region law officer and Director); and 
Mi Mi Yi (Retired Supreme Court Deputy Director). 
227  The Chief Justice of the Union v. Ministry of Home Affairs, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23 (Myan.) 
[hereinafter Chief Justice v. MHA]. 
228  Courts of Magistrates with first class judicial power can only impose the following sentences:  
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, including such solitary confinement as is authorized by 
law; Fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; Whipping.”  Higher sentences can only be imposed by higher 
classes of Magistrates.  Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898, ch. III, § 32(a) (Myan.). 
229  Chief Justice v. MHA, supra note 227, at 23-24. 
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the executive branch would infringe upon the judiciary’s constitutionally 
protected independence.230  
The MHA based its argument largely on historical precedents.  It 
noted that even under the 1947 Constitution, the government used 
administrative officials to adjudicate local criminal cases.231 After the 1988 
coup, the SLORC/SPDC revived this practice with the 1988 Judiciary 
Law.232 Given how much the 2008 Constitution borrowed from the 1947 
Constitution, and the fact that the 2008 Constitution was drafted by the 
SPDC, the MHA actually had a fairly compelling historical argument to 
support its position.  The MHA asked the Tribunal to interpret the text of the 
2008 Constitution in light of undisputed historical practices in Myanmar.  
Given the language of § 11(a)—that the judicial power should be “separated, 
to the extent possible” 233—the Tribunal probably could have found sufficient 
textual ambiguity to justify following historical precedent.234 
Instead, the Tribunal ruled that the MHA’s decision was 
unconstitutional and stated unequivocally that § 11(a) should be read as a 
firm guarantee of judicial independence, despite the ambiguity.235  It argued 
that § 11(a) could not be read in isolation, but rather in context with § 18(a) 
and Chapter VI, which describe the judicial power and only vest it in the 
judiciary. 236  It noted that nowhere does the Constitution authorize 
administrative officers to perform judicial functions.237 It also explicitly 
rejected the use of historical arguments.  It stated that the situation under the 
SPDC was “not the same” because the 2008 Constitution had not yet gone 
into effect. 238  Therefore, the Tribunal found the MHA administrative 
adjudicators unconstitutional.239  
The Constitutional Tribunal clearly took a textualist approach despite 
clear historical precedent against doing so.  The decision did not 
unequivocally reject historical precedent, but rather stated that it would only 
                                                      
230  Id. at 24-25. 
231  Id., at 28-29. 
232  See State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 1988, No. 2/1988, ch. VI, § 
11 (Myan.). 
233  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 11 (Myan.). 
234  For example, the U.S. permits the use of administrative law judges, despite no clear evidence in 
Article III of the Constitution supporting their use.  See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMININISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL 
THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION (1990). 
235  Chief Justice v. MHA, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23 (Myan.). 
236  Id. at 33. 
237  Id. at 33-34. 
238  Id. at 33. 
239  Id. at 36. 
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consider precedent arising out of the 2008 Constitution.240  In other words, 
the Tribunal would not use historical practices or law under previous 
constitutions in order to interpret the 2008 Constitution. 241  Indeed, as 
discussed below, the Tribunal’s next few cases made extensive use of 
National Convention proceedings to interpret the Constitution.  
2. Dr. Aye Maung v. Myanmar 
In Dr. Aye Maung, et. al. v. Myanmar, a group of Amyotha Hluttaw 
MPs filed a petition to invalidate a portion of the 2011 Law of Emoluments, 
Allowances, and Insignia of Office for Representatives of the Region or 
State.242  In particular, they argued that §§ 5 and 17 excluded state/region 
level Ministers for National Races Affairs from certain benefits that other 
ministers enjoyed.243  They argued that the Constitution does not distinguish 
between types of ministers and that all ministers should be treated equally.244  
The Union Attorney-General argued that § 262(a)(iv) of the 2008 
Constitution authorized the appointment of an official from the state/regional 
hluttaw to oversee race or ethnic affairs and described the process of 
appointment, but did not explicitly confer ministerial status.245  He also noted 
that the Ministers of National Races Affairs performed different duties from 
other ministers and therefore could not claim the same rights.246 
The Constitutional Tribunal found that the National Races Affairs 
Ministers did in fact qualify as ministers under the law.247  It noted that § 
262(f) of the Constitution allows the president to appoint the persons 
selected by the state/regional Chief Minister “as Ministers” and does not 
differentiate those appointments from those selected under § 262(a)(iv).248  
In addition, the Tribunal referenced the 2010 Union Government Law and 
the Region or State Government Law in order to interpret the Constitution.249  
The Region or State Government Law explicitly uses the term “ministers” to 
                                                      
240  See id. at 33. 
241  See id. 
242  Dr. Aye Maung, et al., v. The Rep. of the Union of Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 6 (Myan.) 
[hereinafter Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan.].  
243  Under § 5 of the law, the National Races Affairs Ministers would have received an allowance of 
MMK 1,000,000 (10 lakhs) monthly as opposed to MMK 2,000,000 (20 lakhs) enjoyed by other ministers.  
See Law of Emoluments, Allowances and Insignia of Office for Representatives of the Region or State, 
2011, No. 3/2011, §§ 4-5 (Myan.).  In addition, they would have received fewer non-pecuniary benefits 
than other ministers.  See id. at §§ 16-17. 
244  Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., supra note 242, at 64-65. 
245  Id. at 66. 
246  Id. at 67. 
247  Id. at 81. 
248  Id. at 72-74. 
249  Id. at 74-75. 
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describe the officials who manage national races affairs.250  The Union 
Government Law provides a list of state/regional officials whom the 
President can appoint, including state/regional “ministers” but not other 
executive agency officials.251  Therefore, the members struck down §§ 5 and 
17 of the Law of Emoluments as unconstitutional.252 
As in Chief Justice v. MHA, the Constitutional Tribunal’s reasoning 
was still primarily textualist, in that it focused on the text of the Constitution 
and how the different parts of § 262 fit together.  The Attorney-General did 
attempt to analogize the case to principles of private employment law, when 
he noted that the National Races Affairs Ministers did not have the same 
duties as other ministers and therefore are not entitled to the same rights.253  
The Tribunal rejected this by explaining that private law was not informative 
with regard to public employment.254 
Unlike the previous case, the Constitutional Tribunal did consider 
original intent.  The Tribunal cited a description of the basic principles from 
the National Convention Plenary Session, stating in effect that state/region 
ministers have the same status of Union deputy ministers.255  However, this 
part of the decision is likely dicta, as the quote only talks about ministers 
generally, not the National Races Affairs Ministers in particular. 256  
Textualist arguments still dominated the Tribunal’s reasoning.  The Tribunal 
curtly dismissed the Attorney-General’s contention that there had never been 
any intention to make the National Races Affairs Ministers full state/regional 
ministers because the basic principles of the constitution take precedence.257  
3. President v. Dr. Aye Maung 
In early 2012, President Thein Sein submitted a petition requesting 
that the Constitutional Tribunal overturn its decision in Dr. Aye Maung v. 
Myanmar.258  In President v. Dr. Aye Maung, the Constitutional Tribunal 
reaffirmed its earlier decision, noting that § 324 of the 2008 Constitution 
                                                      
250  The Region or State Government Law, 2010, No. 16 /2010, § 10(a)(ii) (Myan.). 
251  See The Union Government Law, 2010, No. 15/2010, § 19(c) (Myan.). 
252  Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 81 (Myan.). 
253  Id. at 80. 
254  Id. at 80. 
255  Id. at 77. 
256  See id. 
257  Id. at 75-76.  This case has also been described as a proxy fight between the legislature and the 
president by those knowledgeable.  Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (Dec. 31, 2011).  
258 State Constitutional Tribunal Hears Attorney-General’s Query, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN. 9, Feb. 
25, 2012, at 9. 
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states all Tribunal decisions are “final and conclusive.”259  The decision itself 
is relatively brief and did not change the legal basis for Dr. Aye Maung v. 
Myanmar.  However, in rejecting the president’s petition, it does provide two 
additional examples of the Constitutional Tribunal’s attitude towards 
historical and legal analogies.  
First, the Attorney-General argued that the Constitutional Tribunal 
should follow the interpretation in the 1961 Supreme Court decision, Bo 
Sein Toe v. Sein Toe,260 which found that the phrase “shall be final and 
conclusive” in the Parliament Selection Act did not prohibit the Court from 
reversing itself when it had made an error in law.261 The Tribunal rejected 
this argument because the Constitutional Tribunal’s authority is different 
from that of the Supreme Court and its powers are not binding on the 
Tribunal. 262  Again, the Tribunal’s rejection of historical evidence was 
premised on its lack of relevance to the question at hand. 
Second, the Attorney-General attempted to argue that the Myanmar 
Code of Civil Procedure should govern in the absence of a specific rule 
about reversing decisions in the Constitutional Tribunal Law.263 The Tribunal 
agreed that § 21 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law did incorporate the Code 
of Civil Procedure, but only with regard to hearings, not decisions.264  
Relying upon a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, the Tribunal stated 
that “hearings” were for the purpose of obtaining evidence and reaching a 
decision, but did not extend to a decision already issued.265 Interestingly, the 
Tribunal also cited a 1986 case, Sein Hlaing v. Maung Maung Aye,266 to 
elaborate upon the definition of “hearing.” Its willingness to cite this case 
suggests that the Tribunal would accept historical analogies in order to 
interpret general legal terms, but not to interpret the 2008 Constitution. 
                                                      
259  President of the Union v. Dr. Aye Maung, et al., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.) [hereinafter 
President v. Dr. Aye Maung]. 
260  Id. at 2. 
261  Id. at 2-3. 
262  Id. at 3; see also MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 294 (Myan.). 
263  President v. Dr. Aye Maung, supra note 259, at 3. 
264  Id. at 4. 
265  Id. 
266  Id. 
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4. President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s third case, President v. Pyidaungsu 
Hluttaw, 267  engendered the most controversy and led directly to the 
impeachment crisis (discussed infra in Part IV.C).  The precise political 
interests underlying the dispute are unclear.  The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and its 
defenders argued that “union level organization” status allowed legislative 
committees to oversee the executive branch and to subpoena government 
ministers.268  However, President Thein Sein allegedly grew concerned that 
Hluttaw committees were using their powers to delay the passage of critical 
legislation, including the Foreign Investment Law, which was subject to over 
94 amendments and was debated for months.269  Thus, in early 2012, the 
president asked if Pyidaungsu Hluttaw legislative committees fell under the 
category of “union level organizations” under the 2008 Constitution.270 
As a matter of law, the 2008 Constitution itself does not provide an 
explicit definition of “union level organization,” although it does use the 
term several times.271  The Attorney-General argued that the Constitution 
mentions the possibility of inviting “union level organizations” to submit 
proposals to the legislature, implying that these were external bodies.272  
Although the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw itself and each of its chambers are “union 
level organizations,” it cannot be imputed that its representatives are as 
                                                      
267  President of the Union v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw et. al., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 4 (Myan), reprinted 
in Verdict Handed Down on Submission No. 1/2012 Submitted by Attorney-General of the Union on Behalf 
of the President of the Union, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 16, 2012, at 4 [hereinafter President v. 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw]. 
268  Union Level Crossword Still Unresolved, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 6, 2012, at 16. 
269  Id. 
270  Gregory B. Poling & Kathleen Bissonnette, Myanmar’s Crisis Calls for Constitutional 
Overhauling, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., Sept. 14, 2012, http://csis.org/publication/myanmars-
crisis-calls-constitutional-overhauling.  Other commentators point to possible financial motives.  Aung 
Htoo, a human rights lawyer, claimed that MPs wanted to earn honorariums, allowances, privileges, and 
facilities commensurate to those of Union ministers and thus sought to classify committees as “union level 
organizations.”  Aung Htoo, A Constitutional Crisis in Burma?, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Sept. 7, 
2012, https://www.dvb.no/analysis/a-constitutional-crisis-in-burma/23662.  He claims this would have 
incurred an enormous expense given that there were thirty active Hluttaw committees at the time, 
especially as some committees included non-MPs as members.  Id.  After impeachment, MP U Stephen of 
Kengtung Constituency rejected this claim, noting that not a single MP had taken the emoluments of Union 
ministers.  TOE NAING MANN, THE EXPLAINING TO THE VERDICT HANDED DOWN BY THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL COURT OF THE UNION ON THE ISSUE OF UNION LEVEL ORGANIZATION 15 
(2012). 
271  See, e.g., MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, § 140(b) (Myan.) (providing that members of the 
organization representing any Union Level Body formed under the Constitution are entitled “to explain, 
converse and discuss Bills or matters relating to their Bodies when they are attending sessions of the 
Committees, Commissions and Bodies of the Pyithu Hluttaw with the permission of the Head of the 
Committee, Commission or Body concerned.”). 
272  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, supra note 267, at 4. 
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well.273 For its part, the Hluttaw noted that term was already defined in the 
2010 Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law and the 2010 Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw 
Laws as including committees or bodies formed by the legislature.274 It then 
challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, alleging that the Tribunal only had 
jurisdiction over laws passed by the government after the enactment of the 
2008 Constitution.275  
Before reaching its decision, the Constitutional Tribunal discussed 
approaches of constitutional interpretation.  It distinguished between the 
interpretation of a statute “literally which can be availed by itself [sic]” 
versus the “consideration of those provisions construed with the intention of 
the drafters.” 276  It also acknowledged that the 1973 Interpretation of 
Expressions Law advised consideration of the “intention and attitude” of the 
drafters.277 This is the first time the Tribunal explicitly discussed methods of 
constitutional interpretation, and while it did not use the labels employed by 
comparative constitutional law scholars (e.g., “textualist” versus 
“originalist”), it did fairly accurately summarize those schools of 
constitutional thought. 278 
The Tribunal combined textualist and originalist approaches to the 
case.  First, it noted that Chapter IV of the Constitution made separate 
provisions for the formation of legislative committees. 279  Given the 
separation of powers in the Constitution, the Tribunal took this to imply that 
legislative committees were being treated differently and separately from 
“Union Level Organizations.” 280  Then it cited National Convention 
Chairman Aung Toe’s statement that the president has the authority to 
“designate [] the number of members of the Union Level Organizations to be 
                                                      
273  Id. at 5. 
274  The Law Relating to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 2010, No. 11/2010, § 2(f) (Myan.); The Law Relating 
to Pyithu Hluttaw, 2010, No. 12/2010, § 2(h) (Myan.); The Law Relating to Amyotha Hluttaw, 2010, No. 
13/2010, § 2(h) (Myan.). 
275  Under § 322(b) of the Constitution and § 12(b) of the Constitutional Tribunal Law, one of the 
functions and duties of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union is “vetting” or “scrutinizing” whether “the 
laws promulgated by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the regional hluttaw, the state hluttaw, or the Self-
Administered Division Leading Body and the Self-Administered Zone Leading Body are in conformity 
with the Constitution.”  See Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI, § 12(b) (Myan.) (The State 
Peace and Development Council Law). 
276  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 4 (Myan), reprinted in Verdict Handed 
Down on Submission No. 1/2012 Submitted by Attorney-General of the Union on Behalf of the President of 
the Union, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 16, 2012, at 6. 
277  Id. (citing Interpretation of Expressions Law, 1973, No. 22/1973, § 4 (Myan.) (The relevant 
provision reads:  “In interpreting any provision of law, the proceedings of the law drafting commission or 
of the legislative authority before enactment of such law the drafts of the law and the statement of objects 
and reasons for enacting the law may be taken into consideration.”)).  
278  Burmese does not have direct translations for the terms textualism or originalism. 
279  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, supra note 276. 
280  Id. 
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formed under the Constitution.”281  The Tribunal interpreted this to define 
“Union Level Organizations” as 1) bodies arising out of the 2008 
Constitution, 2) whose members were appointed by the president, and 3) 
confirmed by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.282 Therefore, the Tribunal declared 
that legislative committees were not “Union Level Organizations.”  
Both parties actually made policy arguments.  The Attorney-General 
noted that legislative committees only serve for a limited time to study 
specific issues, and as such, do not rise to the level of “Union Level 
Organizations.”283  By contrast, the Hluttaw pointed out that legislatures 
under the previous 1947 and 1974 Constitutions had formed legislative 
committees, and that allocating work to committees was an “[i]nternational 
practice.”284  However, consistent with previous cases, the Tribunal did not 
accept these arguments as relevant.285 
5. Mon State v. Myanmar 
The Constitutional Tribunal seemed to abandon its strict 
textualist/originalist approach in July 2012, when it received its first petition 
from a state/regional government. 286   In Mon State v. Myanmar, the 
chairman of the Mon State hluttaw asked the Tribunal to invalidate the 1993 
Municipal Law.287  The Mon State hluttaw wanted to enact a new municipal 
law but believed the Union legislation precluded it from doing so.  It argued 
that municipal governance is not covered under the Constitution’s Union 
legislative list (Schedule I) but is instead included under the state/regional 
legislative list (Schedule II), giving the latter exclusive jurisdiction.288  The 
state claimed that the law should be rendered void under § 446, a transitional 
clause allowing existing laws to remain in operation only if not contrary to 
the Constitution.289  The Union Attorney-General countered that the Union 
legislature would first have to amend or repeal the law.290 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s decision reached several determinations.  
First, it agreed that the Mon State hluttaw had jurisdiction over municipal 
                                                      
281  Id. 
282  Id. 
283  Id. at 4. 
284  Id. at 5. 
285  Id. 
286  Constitutional Tribunal of the State Hears Enquiry, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., July 17, 2012, 
at 7. 
287  Chairperson of the Mon State Hluttaw v. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, [2012] No. 
2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.) [hereinafter Mon State v. Myan.]. 
288  Id. at 1; see also MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, §§ 96, 188, Schedules I-II (Myan.). 
289  MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 288, at § 446. 
290  Mon State v. Myanmar, supra note 287, at 2. 
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affairs.291  It then held that the transitional clause of the Constitution allowed 
previous laws to remain in force until explicitly amended or repealed by the 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.292  However, the Tribunal then went on to advise that 
the Union legislature should repeal the 1993 Municipal Law and authorized 
the Mon State government to enact its own municipal law.293  The Tribunal 
proposed a phased process whereby the various states and regions enact their 
own municipal laws before the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw repeals the Union law.294  
The Tribunal seemed worried about the possibility of a legal vacuum if the 
Union law was repealed first. 295 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s reasoning in this case is much less 
textualist than its previous decisions, and perhaps not coincidentally, the 
reasoning is also less clear.  First, allowing the 1993 Municipal Law to 
remain in force despite acknowledging its unconstitutionality effectively 
reads the phrase “so far as [existing laws] are not contrary to the 
Constitution” out of § 446 of the Constitution.  In effect, the Tribunal 
members seemed to be undertaking a balancing test, weighing the extent of 
unconstitutionality against the policy implications of immediately nullifying 
the law.  They seemed particularly adamant in assuring the Mon State 
hluttaw that it could pass its own municipal law even in the absence of 
action at the Union level.  However, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
balancing test, the members never engaged in a thorough discussion of the 
policy issues at stake.  The Tribunal advised that it would be “more suitable” 
for the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to repeal the law,296 but did not set a deadline or 
assess the likelihood that the other states/regions would pass their own 
municipal laws soon.297  
The decision was issued in July 2012, during a period when legislators 
were increasingly calling for impeachment proceedings against the 
Constitutional Tribunal members over the “Union Level Organizations” 
case.298  The Mon State case did not receive nearly as much media attention, 
but the uproar might nevertheless have made the Tribunal members more 
nervous about challenging the government.  Indeed, the central question 
                                                      
291  Id. at 5. 
292  Id. 
293  Id. at 5-6. 
294  Id. at 7. 
295  Id. 
296  Id. at 5. 
297  Fortunately, it appears that other states have interpreted the decision as permitting them to pass 
municipal laws.  Both Shan State and Kayin State had passed their own municipal laws by late 2013.  See 
HAMISH NIXON ET AL., STATE AND REGION GOVERNMENTS IN MYANMAR, available at http://asiafoundatio
n.org/resources/pdfs/StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmarCESDTAF.PDF. 
298  See infra Part IV.C. 
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here, as in the previous case, concerned the constitutionality of laws passed 
under the SLORC/SPDC.  The members clearly tried very hard to realize a 
pragmatic compromise in this decision, even at the expense of a strict 
textualist approach to constitutional interpretation. 
C.  Impeachment of the Tribunal Members 
Even though in 2011 the ambiguity surrounding the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s independence seemed to be an academic question, by mid-2012 
the Tribunal faced an existential threat to its independence.  Before March 
2012, the Tribunal had received three cases and declared a Union law 
unconstitutional in all of them.  While the President’s Office and MPs 
criticized several of the Tribunals decisions, 299  the Tribunal itself only 
became a source of controversy once—albeit indirectly—when the speaker 
of the Amyotha Hluttaw, Khin Aung Myint, proposed allowing the Tribunal 
to conduct abstract review on draft legislation.300  Ultimately, Pyithu Hluttaw 
Speaker Shwe Mann defeated this proposal, arguing that it infringed upon 
the legislature’s lawmaking authority and was not necessary.301 
This changed after the “Union Level Organizations” case.  Amyotha 
Hluttaw Deputy Speaker U Mya Nyein alleged that the Constitutional 
Tribunal exceeded the scope of the Attorney General’s petition in issuing a 
decision about the constitutional status of legislative committees. 302  
Lawmakers seemed to have interpreted the ruling as an attempt to limit the 
power of the legislature to conduct oversight activities, such as subpoenaing 
government ministers. 303   Increasingly, MPs and lawyers outside the 
government attacked the Tribunal’s decision as incorrect and the Tribunal 
members as unqualified.304  Given that most of the members had been 
selected by the military in February 2011 and that the legislature had been 
given little opportunity to review their qualifications, it is not surprising the 
                                                      
299  See, e.g., Decision Sparks Hluttaw Row, THE MYAN. TIMES, Nov. 7-13, 2011, 
http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/news/600/news60001.html.  
300  Id. 
301  Pyithu Hluttaw Session Continues for 47th Day: As There Was No Disagreement on the Report, 
the Hluttaw Decided to Send Back the Hluttaw Office Bill, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Nov. 15, 2011, at 1, 
7. 
302  Soe Than Lynn, Reps Slam Ruling on Status of Committees, THE MYAN. TIMES, Apr. 30-May 6, 
2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/624/news62415.html.  
303  Id.  But as Derek Tonkin, former U.K. ambassador to Thailand, points out, this does not 
necessarily mean that ministers cannot be invited to testify.  Derek Tonkin, U.S. – Myanmar Relations 2012, 
NETWORK MYAN., http://www.networkmyanmar.org/index.php/external-relations/united-states/2012 (last 
visited May 20, 2014).  
304  MANN, supra note 270.  The author confirmed this point in private conversations in Yangon, 
Myanmar in May 2012. 
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Hluttaw MPs had little invested in the members despite having nominally 
appointed six of them.  By April 24, the Hluttaw Joint Bill Committee had 
issued a report concluding that the Constitutional Tribunal was in error and 
that legislative committees were “Union Level Organizations.”305  While the 
legislature went on recess soon afterward, the decision would not be 
forgotten. 
In early August 2012, 301 Pyithu Hluttaw MPs signed a petition to 
impeach the Tribunal members.306  Attempting to compromise, Speaker 
Shwe Mann asked the Tribunal members to resign voluntarily and set a 
deadline of August 21.307  However, President Thein Sein rebuffed the 
legislature’s demands and the Tribunal members remained in office after the 
deadline.308  The Amyotha Hluttaw then passed a motion to impeach the 
Tribunal members by a 167-56 vote, with only the military MPs opposed.309  
In a vote of 447-168—noticeably more than required to support a vote of 
conviction—the joint Pyidaungsu Hluttaw passed a resolution supporting 
impeachment.310  The non-binding nature of the resolution was likely an 
attempt to allow the Tribunal members to save face.  On August 28, the 
Pyithu Hluttaw formed a fifteen-member committee to investigate the 
charges.311 MPs claimed that the Tribunal had violated the 2008 Constitution 
by reaching an incorrect decision.312  Soon afterward, the legislature also 
filed formal impeachment charges.313  On September 6, all nine Tribunal 
members resigned.314 
                                                      
305  Lynn, supra note 302. 
306  Speaker Requests Patience of Parliamentarian; Row over Union Level Organization Definition to 
be Sent to President, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 15, 2012, at 9; see also Kyaw Phone Kyaw, Burma's 
Constitutional Tribunal Members Should Resign: Shwe Mann, MIZZIMA NEWS, Aug. 15, 2012, 
http://mizzimaenglish.blogspot.com/2012/08/burmas-constitutional-tribunal-members.html. 
307  Speaker Requests Patience of Parliamentarian; Row over Union Level Organization Definition to 
Be Sent to President, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 15, 2012, at 16. 
308  Will the Burmese Parliament Impeach the Constitutional Tribunal? MIZZIMA NEWS, Aug. 22, 
2012, http://www.bnionline.net/index.php/news/mizzima/13575-will-the-burmese-parliament-impeach-the-
constitutional-tribunal-.html.  
309  Soe Than Lynn & Win Ko Ko Latt, Reps Move Towards Impeachment, THE MYAN. TIMES, Aug. 
27-Sept. 2, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/641/news01.html. 
310  Xinhua, Myanmar Parliament Passes Resolution over Constitutional Tribunal Decision Dispute, 
GLOBAL TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/729370.shtml.  
311 Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Has Power to Issue Orders Regarding Administration, NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., 
Aug. 30, 2012, at 9.  Just before they resigned, the Tribunal members complained that the Hluttaw 
members on the committee suffered from a conflict of interest because they had also been involved in the 
vote for impeachment.  Remonstration of Chairman of Investigation Board U Thein Swe and Members, 
NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 4, 2012, at 7. 
312  Lynn & Latt, supra note 309. 
313  Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Has Power to Issue Orders Regarding Administration, supra note 311. 
314  Republic of the Union of Myanmar Office of the President, Resignations of Chairman and 
Members of Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Allowed, 2012, Order No. 29/2012 (Myan.), reprinted in 
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 6, 2012, at 1. 
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The factions in the impeachment debate defied many predictions of 
how Myanmar’s young democracy would operate.315  On one hand, most of 
the opposition parties, including the NLD, joined the USDP majority in 
supporting impeachment.316   The main political parties had come to a 
consensus over the issue.317  On the other side, the president and military 
MPs opposed impeachment.318  This led some observers to claim that the 
dispute represented a divide between “reformers” and “conservatives.”319  
However, the Tribunal’s reasoning in the “Union Level Organizations” case 
was not patently a breach of the Constitution, as some MPs claimed.320  The 
president, while sometimes frustrated at the pace of lawmaking, had not 
made any reactionary moves against the legislature.  The military tended to 
refrain from overt politicking; the Tribunal impeachment was one of the few 
times MPs voted as a bloc against a clear majority of the civilian 
politicians.321 
Rather, the impeachment drive reflected the legislature’s desire to 
protect its hard-won power.  Just a year before, the legislature had widely 
been expected to act as a “rubber stamp.” Many MPs saw the Tribunal’s 
decision, and constitutional review more broadly, as an encroachment into 
their legislative prerogative.322  The fall 2011 debate about granting the 
Tribunal abstract review over draft legislation prefigured the impeachment 
saga when Speaker Shwe Mann insisted that the Hluttaw had a monopoly 
over lawmaking.323  Surprisingly, the legislature and the public at large rarely 
                                                      
315  Including in Nardi, supra note 176, at 25-27, where the author predicted that the Tribunal would 
realize that their independence was limited and thus would not challenge the legislature.  When it did so, 
the backlash was inevitable. 
316  Will the Burmese Parliament Impeach the Constitutional Tribunal?, supra note 308.  In fact, U Ye 
Tun, the Pyithu Hluttaw MP who had initially suggested impeachment to Speaker Shwe Mann, was a 
member of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party.  See Ye Tun, Why I Opposed Tribunal Law Changes, 
THE MYAN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/in-depth/3581-why-i-opposed-
tribunal-law-changes.html.  
317  Will the Burmese Parliament impeach the Constitutional Tribunal?, supra note 308. 
318  Lynn & Latt, supra note 309. 
319  Gwen Robinson, Myanmar at Risk of Constitutional Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, 
http://www. 
ft.com/intl/cms/s/27b49c54-f38e-11e1-b3a2-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location= http%3A% 
2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F27b4#axzz2s8T5NcEp. 
320  Lynn & Latt, supra note 309; MANN, supra note 270, at 7. 
321   INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 178, at 7. 
322  Lawi Weng, Constitutional Tribunal Dispute Heats Up, THE IRRAWADDY, Aug. 21, 2012, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/thein-sein/constitutional-tribunal-dispute-heats-up.html; Nyein Nyein, 
Constitutional Tribunal Could Face Impeachment, THE IRRAWADDY, Aug. 16, 2012, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/shwe-mann/constitutional-tribunal-could-face-impeachment.html. 
323  See infra Part III.A. 
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discussed the legal reasoning in the “union level organizations” decision.324  
Allegedly, most MPs had not even bothered to read the decision.325  
Before appointing new Constitutional Tribunal members, the 
government took the opportunity to amend the Constitutional Tribunal 
Law.326  First, the amendments require Tribunal members to report to the 
president, the Pyithu Hluttaw speaker, and the Amyotha Hluttaw speaker.327  
Second, the amendments could undermine the finality of Tribunal decisions 
because the text of the law can now be read as acknowledging only cases 
appealed through the ordinary courts (under § 323) as final.328  The new law 
also granted the legislature rather than the president authority to select the 
Chairperson of the Tribunal,329 even though this contradicts the text of the 
Constitution.330 
The government finally appointed new Constitutional Tribunal 
members on February 21, 2013. 331   Since the impeachment crisis, the 
                                                      
324  One notable exception was the staff at The Myanmar Times, which published several articles and 
op-eds calling for a compromise.  Thomas Kean, Compromise Needed on Tribunal, Hluttaw Rift, THE 
MYAN. TIMES, Sept. 3-9, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/642/news02.html. 
325  Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (May 2013).  U Ye Tun, the MP who had 
originally proposed impeachment, had changed his mind after reading the decision and asked Shwe Mann 
to halt the impeachment efforts, but the latter claimed the drive had already assumed a momentum of its 
own.  Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (Dec. 2013). 
326  Bill Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law Discussed, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Nov. 16, 
2012, at 9, 16. 
327  Ye Tun, Why I Opposed Tribunal Law Changes, THE MYAN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, 
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/in-depth/3581-why-i-opposed-tribunal-law-changes.html; see also 
Law Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2013, No. 4/2013, § 12(i) (Myan.) [hereinafter Const. 
Trib. Amend. Law]. 
328  Id.; see also Const. Trib. Amend. Law, supra note 327, at § 12(g) -§ 24. 
329  Constitutional Tribunal Will Have to Settle Many Disputes in the Future Lack of Power to Pass 
Final Resolution May Cause More Problems, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Jan. 15, 2013, at 16.  
330  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 321 (Myan.).  In commenting on the draft law, the 
President attempted to point this out but the Hluttaw overrode his objections.  Constitutional Tribunal Will 
Have to Settle Many Disputes in the Future Lack of Power to Pass Final Resolution May Cause More 
Problems, supra note 329, at 16; see also Soe Than Lynn, MPs Ignore President on Tribunal Law Changes, 
THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/3851-
mps-ignore-president-on-tribunal-law-changes.html.  
331  Republic of the Union of Myanmar Office of the President, Appointment of Chairman and 
Members of Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, 2013, Order No. 12/2013 (Feb. 26, 2013) (Myan.), 
reprinted in THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 26, 2013, at 1; see also Win Naung Toe, Burma MPs Nominate 
Constitutional Court Chief, RADIO FREE ASIA, Feb. 21 2013,  http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ 
constitutional-tribunal-02212013175458.html. The new members are: 
U Myint Win (Retired Attorney-General’s Office Deputy Director-General); 
U Than Kyaw (Legal Advisor to the President); 
Daw Hla Myo Nwe (Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); 
U Mya Thein (Retired Director-General of the Union Supreme Court); 
U Mya Thein (Notary Public Advocate and Supreme Court advocate); 
U Myint Lwin (Notary Public Advocate and Supreme Court advocate); 
U Tin Myint (Retired Director-General of Union Attorney-General’s Office); 
Daw Kyin San (Retired Deputy Director-General of Union Attorney-General’s Office); 
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Tribunal has received no further petitions,332 although on January 30 the 
president indicated that he might submit eight recently passed laws for 
review.333 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 
This Part considers several interrelated questions about the Myanmar 
Constitutional Tribunal’s use of jurisprudence.  First, did the Tribunal 
develop a clear jurisprudential approach to constitutional interpretation?  
Second, was textualism/originalism appropriate for the Constitutional 
Tribunal given Myanmar’s political situation, as opposed to living 
constitutionalist or proportionality approaches?  Finally, what effect—if 
any—did that choice have on the Tribunal’s relationship with the legislature 
and the subsequent impeachment imbroglio?  
A.  The Development of Tribunal Jurisprudence 
The Constitutional Tribunal only issued five decisions, so the sample 
of cases remains small.  Nevertheless, a few trends seem clear.  In President 
v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw the Tribunal identified textualist and originalist 
approaches to constitutional interpretation,334 suggesting that it accepted both 
as legitimate.  The Tribunal relied heavily on textualist methods of 
constitutional interpretation during its first year.335  Although the 2008 
Constitution is not Myanmar’s first constitution, in Chief Justice v. MHA and 
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw the Tribunal rejected the use of historical 
precedent in interpreting constitutional provisions.336  It declared that prior 
practice was not relevant as the 2008 Constitution had changed the legal 
framework of the country.337  
                                                                                                                                                                 
U Myo Chit (Retired Director of the Union Attorney-General’s Office). 
332  Sandar Win, No Work for New Tribunal, THE MYAN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.mmtimes. 
com/index.php/national-news/6599-no-work-for-new-tribunal.html. 
333  The laws that might be challenged include the 2014 Anti-Corruption Law and the Farmers’ Rights 
Protection Law, as well as amended versions of the Pyithu Hluttaw Law, Amyotha Hluttaw Law, 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law, Region and State Hluttaw Law, Union Auditor General’s Office Law, and 
Constitutional Tribunal Law.  Sandar Win, President to Test New Constitutional Tribunal with Eight Laws, 
THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9400-president-to-
test-new-constitutional-tribunal-with-eight-laws.html; see also Soe Than Lynn, Committee Slams President 
Over Criticism, THE MYAN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/ 
7964 -committee-slams-president-over-criticism.html. 
334  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 6 (Myan). 
335  See generally Chief Justice v. MHA [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.) and Dr. Aye Maung v. 
Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.). 
336  See Chief Justice v. MHA, supra note 335, at 33. 
337  See id. 
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By contrast, the Constitutional Tribunal frequently cited the drafting 
history of the 2008 Constitution, as represented in the National Convention 
proceedings. 338   The Tribunal members clarified that they would only 
consider the original understanding of the Constitution at the time of the 
drafting; they would not reinterpret the drafters’ intent through subsequent 
legislation or political developments.339  In President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 
the National Convention proceedings even took precedence over existing 
laws that purported to define “union-level organizations.”340  Paradoxically, 
the authoritarian nature of the National Convention might have helped make 
the 2008 Constitution more amenable to originalist approaches.  Unlike the 
American Federalist Papers, which contain competing arguments from 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, 341  the National Convention proceedings 
required all speeches to conform to the chairman’s program.342  
For its first four decisions, the Constitutional Tribunal never relied 
upon any sources other than the text of the 2008 Constitution and the 
National Convention proceedings.  It never discussed the dramatic political 
reforms that had occurred after the 2010 elections, or if the Tribunal ought to 
“update” the Constitution in order to account for these changes.  The closest 
the Tribunal came to making a living constitutionalist argument was in Dr. 
Aye Maung v. Myanmar, when it mentioned that the Constitution promoted 
the participation of ethnic minorities.343  However, it merely used text from 
one part of the Constitution—§ 17(c)—to inform its interpretation of another 
part. 344  It never argued that ethnic minorities should have greater 
representation as a matter of legal fairness or to fulfill the expectations of a 
“free and democratic society.”345  Nor did it refer to the military’s ongoing 
civil war with ethnic insurgent groups as a pressing policy justification for 
affording National Races Affairs Ministers the same status as other 
                                                      
338  See generally Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., supra note 335, and President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 
supra note 334. 
339  See id. 
340  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 6 (Myan). 
341  Compare The Federalist No. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that judges should have life 
tenure because the judiciary is the weakest branch of government) with Brutus No. 11-12 & 15 (Brutus) 
(arguing that independent courts with the power of constitutional review would usurp the authority of other 
branches of government).  See also HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1981). 
342  FINK, supra note 97, at 74-77. 
343  Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 76 (Myan.). 
344  Id. 
345  As required by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  See Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 
(U.K.). 
JUNE 2014  FINDING JUSTICE SCALIA IN BURMA 675 
ministers.  The Tribunal only made reference to broader policy concerns in 
Mon State v. Myanmar, but even then only indirectly.346 
B.  The Impact of Tribunal Jurisprudence on the Impeachment 
The proximate cause of the legislature’s drive to impeach the 
Constitutional Tribunal members was its displeasure with the President v. 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw decision.347  The impeachment crisis was a complex 
event involving a wide array of political interests; without internal 
memoranda from the key players, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact 
motivations of the key players.  However, as discussed in Section II, 
throughout Myanmar’s history, political elites have been uncomfortable with 
constitutionalism and separation of powers.  With the brief exception of the 
1947 Constitution, constitutional review had never served as a check on 
government power.  Under the SPDC, senior military leaders—including 
Thein Sein—lectured judges about the need to cooperate with the rest of 
government.348  As such, by delineating and limiting legislative power, 
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw touched upon sensitive issues for 
Myanmar’s political elite. 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s early textualist/originalist approach was 
laudably bold and unyielding, but failed to acclimate political elites to the 
new reality constitutional review—especially so soon after a guarded 
political transition from military rule.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
Tribunal’s approach was risky given its uniquely precarious independence.  
Political elites had not demonstrated a marked hostility towards judicial 
independence since the transition.  Indeed, soon after the impeachment, both 
Speaker Shwe Mann and Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated their support for 
judicial independence. 349  Their statements are not necessarily hypocritical; 
as noted in Part IV.A of this article, the 2008 Constitution is ambiguous 
                                                      
346  See Mon State v. Myan, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.). 
347  See Lynn & Latt, supra note 309. 
348  Judgments Passed by Court Must be Free From Corruption and Should be a Salutary Lesson, 
XVII(27) THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., May 13, 2009, at 8 & 16.  For example, then-Prime Minister Thein 
Sein admonished judges that “administrative and judicial systems cannot operate separately but need to be 
in harmony to be able to protect public interests.”  Id.  His predecessor, Prime Minister Soe Win, 
expressed similar sentiments:  “ [J]udges should realize with vision [sic] that the bureaucratic mind that 
serves the interest of only a few will be against the new system . .  .  It is necessary to have political as 
well as judicial views.”  Judicial Sector to Adapt itself to Reforms Made in Conformity with Forthcoming 
State Constitution: People Will Loath Courts if Latter Apply Pressures and Not Protect Them: Prime 
Minister General Soe Win Meets State/Division Judges and State/Division Law Officers, THE NEW LIGHT 
OF MYAN., Feb. 6, 2007, at 1, 8. 
349 See Sandar Lwin, Hluttaw Speaker Promises Independence for Judiciary, THE MYAN. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/1754-hluttaw-speaker-promises-
independence- for-judiciary.html. 
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regarding the extent to which judicial independence covers the Tribunal.  
Therefore, it is possible that they support independence for the ordinary 
courts, but not for the Tribunal.  
In short, the Tribunal was in a political situation that demanded some 
degree of pragmatism. 350   There are different approaches to political 
pragmatism in constitutional interpretation.  In the celebrated case Marbury 
v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court simultaneously assumed the power of 
judicial review while at the same time imposing limits on its jurisdiction.351 
In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court sometimes attempted to soften the 
impact of its decisions by announcing that the holding only applied in future 
cases or by allowing the government to remedy the constitutional harm on 
its own. 352   The Court even developed the doctrine of “conditional 
constitutionality” in which laws can remain constitutional so long as 
implemented in a manner the court thinks appropriate.353 While the Court’s 
decisions have frequently angered legislators354 and prompted an attempt to 
circumscribe the court’s jurisdiction,355 the Court succeeded in defeating 
those attempts.356  In short, the justices’ pragmatic use of jurisprudence 
                                                      
350  Indeed, few observers had predicted that the Tribunal would end up issuing bold decisions against 
political elites precisely because of its institutional weaknesses.  Nardi, supra note 176. 
351  In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court found that it had the power to 
exercise constitutional review over federal legislation even though Article III of the U.S. Constitution does 
not explicitly grant this power to the court—unlike Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution.  The decision is often 
praised as a politically astute compromise in which Chief Justice John Marshall usurped the power of 
judicial review while at the same time using that power to strike down a law that purported to expand the 
court’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 1, at 98.  It has since become popular for 
scholars to recommend that other new constitutional courts expand their own political power through such 
compromise decisions.  See, e.g., Tahirah Lee, Exporting Judicial Review from the United States to China, 
19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 152 (2005). 
352  Simon Butt, Indonesia's Constitutional Court: Conservative Activist or Strategic Operator?, in 
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 98, 108-110 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012); see also Marcus 
Mietzner, Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the 
Constitutional Court at 1, 10 J. OF EAST ASIAN STUD. 397 (2010); Björn Dressel & Marcus Mietzner, A 
Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia, 25 GOVERNANCE 391 (2012); 
Philippa Venning, Determination of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, 10 AUSTL.  J. OF ASIAN  L. 100 (2008). 
353  See Simon Butt, Conditional Constitutionality, Pragmatism and the Rule of Law, (Sydney Law 
School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09/28,  2009). 
354  Even constitutional law scholars worry that the Court’s “conditionally constitutional” doctrine 
makes it more of a positive legislator rather than adjudicator.  See Butt, supra note 352, at 110.  Also, as 
chief justice, Mohammad Mahfud MD frequently made public comments critical of the government.  See, 
e.g., Camelia Pasandaran, Palace Anger Over Mahfud’s Statement, THE JAKARTA GLOBE, June 22, 2011, 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/palace-anger-over-mahfuds-statement/448561/. 
355  Anita Rachman & Ulma Haryanto, Constitutional Court Powers Rolled Back With Revision, THE 
JAKARTA GLOBE, June 22, 2011, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/constitutional-court-powers-
rolled-back-with-revision/448324/.  
356  Ina Parlina, Justices Restore Court’s Power, THE JAKARTA POST, Oct. 19, 2011, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/19/justices-restore-court-s-power.html.  Ironically, the 
justices declared the law circumscribing the court’s jurisdiction to be unconstitutional.  Id. 
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enabled them to make important policy decisions without triggering calls for 
impeachment.357 
Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal adopted pragmatism in its 
decision in Mon State v. Myanmar, when it refused to strike down the 1993 
Municipal Law despite its alleged unconstitutionality.358 The decision was 
motivated in part by the desire to avoid a legal void were it to strike a 
national law down without state or regional legislation to replace it.359 
However, by July 2012, there were already rumors of impeaching the 
Tribunal members. 360   If the Tribunal’s shift towards pragmatism was 
designed to appease the legislature, it was too late.  Moreover, striking down 
the municipal law would have imposed a relatively small burden on the 
legislature compared to the “union level organizations” decision.  Indeed, it 
is in cases that deal with the core interests of political elites that 
constitutional courts need to be most pragmatic.   
Although the Constitutional Tribunal noted (correctly) that the 2008 
Constitution authorized it to “vet” laws,361 it might have benefitted from 
spending more time justifying that authority.  For example, in its decisions, 
the Tribunal never explicitly explains its theory of constitutional 
interpretation or when it would defer to the legislature’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.  It only mentions theories of interpretation in its third decision, 
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,362 but the Tribunal never discusses how 
this affected its discretion.  In the U.S., Supreme Court Justices Breyer and 
Scalia, otherwise on opposite sides of the debate over constitutional 
interpretation, both take great care to explain how their method of 
interpretation respects Congress’ lawmaking authority by constraining the 
                                                      
357  The analogy between Indonesia and Myanmar is not perfect.  Democracy had become more firmly 
entrenched in Indonesia by 2004, when the Constitutional Court issued its first controversial decisions.  
However, the Indonesian political elite remains relatively hostile to deeper liberalization and has even 
attempted to rollback some reforms.  Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation: Anti-reformist 
Elites and Resilient Civil Society, 19 DEMOCRATIZATION 209 (2011).  Impeachment might have been more 
difficult in Indonesia, but not impossible.  Constitutional Court justices can be dishonorably discharged for 
“commission of an act of misconduct” by the president upon recommendation of the chief justice.  
Constitutional Court Law, 2003, No. 24/2003, ch. IV, art. 23, § 2(b) (Myan).  However, the procedure for 
the removal of justices is contained in the 2003 Constitutional Court Law, not § 24C of the 1945 
Constitution, meaning that the legislature could have amended it at any point.  Again, the fact that the 
legislature did not even apparently consider doing this is partly due to the court’s success in moderating the 
fallout of its decisions. 
358  See Mon State v. Myan., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 5-6 (Myan.). 
359  Id. 
360  Indeed, the author had heard reports that the Hluttaw would face impeachment as early as May 
2012.  
361  See, e.g., President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 5 (Myan). 
362  Id. 
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court’s discretion. 363  By contrast, Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal did 
little to assuage legislators’ fears that it would act as an unaccountable check 
on the legislature. 
C.  Possible Options for Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence 
While a more pragmatic approach might have mitigated confrontation 
between Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 
the ultimate question still remains: were textualist/originalist approaches 
simply ill-suited to the political situation confronting the members? Upon 
assuming office, the Constitutional Tribunal members faced several unique 
challenges.  First, Myanmar’s political elites were not used to being 
constrained by constitutional limitations on their power.  Second, the 2008 
Constitution lacked legitimacy, so there was a real risk some political 
stakeholders would refuse to accept the legitimacy of Tribunal decisions.364 
The members needed to quickly establish that the document was legitimate 
and binding.  Moreover, they needed to establish that the 2008 Constitution 
had value as the source of their rulings.  
The Constitutional Tribunal members primarily had two 
jurisprudential options to bolster their legitimacy as arbiters of the 
constitution.  First, they could have pursued a strict textualist/originalist 
approach to reaffirm the legitimacy of the 2008 Constitution as 
promulgated—the approach they ended up taking.  Alternatively, the 
members could have attempted to “update” the Constitution through a more 
flexible method of interpretation.  One risk with the latter approach is that it 
might have laid bare underlying concerns about the legitimacy of the 
Constitution.  Moreover, it might have created the impression that the 
members were engaging in lawmaking rather than judging.365 A textual 
approach might have seemed more secure and more appropriate to a 
“judicial” body.  However, the Tribunal’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation did not mitigate—and, if anything, seems to have 
exacerbated—the crisis over the “union level organizations” case.  
By contrast, a balancing or proportionality approach might have 
allowed the Constitutional Tribunal to show greater deference to the 
legislature, while reaching the same legal outcomes.  Balancing and 
proportionality tests differ in details but generally require judges to weigh 
                                                      
363  Compare with BREYER, supra note 24, and SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24. 
364  C.f., James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
343 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the legitimacy of individual cases and the legitimacy of 
courts as institutions). 
365  C.f., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24. 
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competing arguments and interests.  Unlike a textualist approach, weighing 
does not simply declare one side “incorrect” but rather acknowledges 
legitimate interests both sides possess and then determines which has the 
stronger constitutional claim.366 In theory, in Chief Justice v. MHA, the 
Constitutional Tribunal could have discussed the conditions under which the 
Constitution allows the executive to limit judicial independence rather than 
treat judicial independence as an absolute.367 Such an analysis might still 
have concluded that appointing administrative officials simply to expedite 
case processing would not have constituted a sufficiently compelling 
objective or least restrictive means.  However, it would also have 
acknowledged the ministry’s policy arguments as reasonable, perhaps 
mitigating the tensions between the government and Tribunal.368 
The Constitutional Tribunal’s originalist approach was particularly 
risky given the speed at which Myanmar’s political reforms were occurring.  
The détente between President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi had 
already occurred by late 2011, just after the Tribunal published its first 
decision.369  Under Shwe Mann, the legislature had become increasingly 
active.  Some critics argue that the Tribunal should have taken greater 
cognizance of these developments. 370   Many of the assumptions and 
expectations at the time the 2008 Constitution was drafted appeared 
outdated, at best.  After all, during the National Convention, many observers 
had assumed the legislature would be a “rubber stamp.” 371   A “living 
constitutionalist” approach might have prompted the Constitutional Tribunal 
to consider if contemporary norms and developments necessitated a 
                                                      
366  See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 46, at 12. 
367  Again, recognizing the ambiguity in § 11(a) of the 2008 Constitution, which only promises 
judicial independence “to the extent possible.”  MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 11(a). 
(Myan.). 
368  Ironically, the Constitutional Tribunal members did not use the Chief Justice v. MHA case to 
justify the Tribunal’s own independence.  While the decision referred to judicial independence for the 
ordinary courts, Chief Justice v. MHA [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.),] at 45, it never explicitly 
extended the principle to the Tribunal.  This is in marked contrast to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.  
When the Indonesian Supreme Court challenged the power of the Judicial Commission to discipline judges 
for ethics violations, the Constitutional Court ruled that the commission’s power violated the constitutional 
principle of judicial independence.  It then explicitly extended the ruling to cover itself, even though no 
constitutional court judges were implicated in the case.  Supreme Court v. Judicial Commission, [2006] 
005/PUU-IV/2006 (Indon.); see also Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Dispute 
Between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability? (Sydney 
Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09/31, 2009). 
369  See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 183. 
370  See, e.g., Nathan Willis, The Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar and the Rule of Law, (draft on 
file with author) (arguing that a “substantive rule of law” approach might have compelled the Tribunal to 
consider the nature of the 2008 Constitution and how it was adopted, leading to a more flexible 
jurisprudence).  
371  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 178. 
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rethinking of how to interpret constitutional ambiguities.  For example, in 
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, living constitutionalism might have led the 
members to consider how the increased prominence of legislative 
committees affected their constitutional status.  It might also have discussed 
how depriving committees of “union level organization” status would affect 
their work.  
The Constitutional Tribunal’s approach to constitutional interpretation 
might also have inadvertently infused its decisions with an overly critical 
tone.  In each of the first four cases, textualist and originalist approaches led 
the Tribunal to definitively declare that either the president or the Hluttaw 
was incorrect.  More importantly, although the Tribunal’s decision did 
reiterate each side’s arguments, originalism gave it little room to 
acknowledge the arguments and interests of the losing side.  For example, in 
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Tribunal claimed that the National 
Convention proceedings “obviously stated” that legislative committees were 
not “union level organizations,”372 despite the fact that many MPs did not 
think it so obvious.  Later, some MPs complained the Tribunal demonstrated 
a lack of respect373—especially worrisome because Burmese political culture 
still expect youths and subordinates to defer to their elders.374  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of how Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal interprets the 
2008 Constitution will become even more important during the latter half of 
2014.  President Thein Sein has already signaled his intent to challenge eight 
new laws before the Tribunal.  In addition, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is 
preparing to propose amendments to the constitution, some of which will 
likely lead to new constitutional disputes.  The new Tribunal members will 
need to decide how much of their predecessors’ jurisprudential reasoning to 
adopt.  Will they pursue a similar originalist approach or pursue a different 
direction?  The members will also need to think strategically about how to 
avoid a confrontation with the legislature given that the 2012 impeachment 
shows they cannot win a showdown.  It would be unfortunate if the members 
decided to alter their outcomes to appease political elites.  Rather, a more 
viable alternative would be to think carefully about the choice of 
interpretative methodology and how it would affect the legislature’s 
reaction.  
                                                      
372  President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 6 (Myan). 
373  Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (May 2012). 
374  See LUCIAN W. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS 97–99 (1985) (arguing that in Burmese political 
culture subordinates fear reporting bad news to their superiors).  
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For its part, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw should consider a package of 
constitutional amendments that would establish a standard of constitutional 
interpretation for the Constitutional Tribunal.  However, in doing so, it 
should adopt a realistic standard that reflects its interests and by which it can 
commit to abide in future disputes.  If it wants the Tribunal to weigh ethical 
and policy considerations, it could consider a flexible balancing test.  Such a 
move would not be unprecedented, as governments around the world have 
incorporated proportionality tests directly into their constitutions.  
Alternatively, if the legislature worries that the Tribunal might usurp its 
lawmaking authority then it should impose a deferential standard.  Several 
constitutions actually include clauses permitting legislatures to pass 
unconstitutional laws so long as they meet certain conditions for a limited 
duration of time.375 Several constitutions incorporate both types of standards, 
granting judges discretion but also preventing them from acting as an undue 
constraint.376 Adopting a clear standard would help make constitutional 
review less threatening to political elites by guiding the Tribunal down 
acceptable paths. 
The Hluttaw should also pass legislation clarifying the grounds for 
impeaching Constitutional Tribunal members.  Impeachment is a crucial tool 
for enhancing judicial accountability and reducing judicial corruption,377 but 
if left vague it could also chill the Tribunal into submission.  MPs justified 
impeachment as necessary because the Tribunal had “breached” the 
Constitution.378  However, § 33 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law states that 
members cannot be impeached for actions taken in “good faith”379  and 
supporters of impeachment had not furnished any proof of bad faith.  The 
term “good faith” itself is not defined in the law.  Does it include decisions 
motivated by partisan preferences—something alleged to occur regularly on 
the U.S. Supreme Court?380  When does issuing a legally unsound decision 
rise to the level of “breaching” the Constitution? Further defining these 
terms would at least help guide future Tribunal members avoid destructive 
showdowns. 
                                                      
375  See, e.g., Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (Isr.), supra note 47, at § 8. 
376  See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
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379  Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VIII, § 33 (Myan.) (The State Peace and 
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Ultimately, the experience of Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal does 
not imply that textualist or originalist approaches to constitutional 
interpretation are inherently unsuited for constitutional courts in 
transitioning democracies.  The situation in Myanmar is too unique to draw 
such a broad conclusion.  Other factors, such as the strategic acumen of the 
court’s leadership, affect the outcome of constitutional crises.  However, this 
article argues that the method of constitutional interpretation can and does 
affect the relationship between courts and the other branches of government.  
Some methods of interpretation lend themselves more easily to weighing 
non-legal factors, such as political and social developments, which might be 
necessary in a rapidly changing political context.  Textualist and originalist 
methods in particular risk framing cases as zero-sum games, which could 
increase tension between the judiciary and the other branches of 
government.  
